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Abstract
Freeze Denton, Tiffany LaRae. Ed.D. The University of Memphis.
August/2014. Temporal Discounting: Using a Shifting Delay Procedure To Teach
Delay-To-Reinforcement. Major Professor: James Meindl, Ph.D., BCBA-D.
The effects of delay on subjective reward value is referred to as temporal or delay
discounting, as the value of the reward is discounted as a result of a delay to the reward’s
presentation. One way to measure the subjective value of delayed rewards is by
assessing choice. In examining temporal discounting, choice trials are presented between
small immediate rewards and larger delayed rewards. Procedures that reverse choice
responding from smaller immediate rewards to larger delayed rewards are important to
teaching an organism to tolerate delayed reinforcement. Teaching children to make
adaptive choices such as compliance, completing assigned tasks, and making functional
requests involves teaching them to forgo engaging in behaviors that result in small sooner
outcomes in favor of those resulting in larger later outcomes. Behavioral procedures to
teach delay-to-reinforcement have produced positive outcomes but are not well
established in the current body of literature. Thus, there are limited standardized
procedures and treatment options available to teach children to choose delayed rewards.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, a literature review was conducted to identify
teaching procedures that have been investigated to increase choice allocation to larger
later rewards over smaller sooner rewards and compare methods employed across studies.
Second, a novel method to teach delay-to-reinforcement tolerance was investigated with
six typically developing young children (ages 4 to 5-years). This novel method, called a
shifting delay procedure, involved closely manipulating the amount of the larger delayed
reward by splitting it into both an immediate and delayed portion, and then gradually
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shifting the immediate portion to the delayed portion. Two participants were not exposed
to treatment as baseline patterns of choice responding indicated consistent choice
allocation for larger delayed rewards. The remaining four participants were exposed to
treatment. For two of the four participants, choice was shifted from the smaller sooner
reward to the larger later reward. For the remaining two participants, treatment was
ineffective in shifting choice allocation. These findings are discussed as well as
suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Organisms, both human and nonhuman, tend to choose more immediate rewards
over delayed rewards when those rewards are otherwise objectively equivalent (Mischel
& Grusec, 1967; Myerson & Green, 1995). This can be conceptualized as a concurrent
schedule of reinforcement. When a choice is available between two rewards that are
equal in actual or objective value but differ in terms of immediacy of delivery, organisms
tend to allocate a greater proportion of responses to the immediate stimulus over the
delayed (Cooper, Heward, & Heron, 2006). For example, if an individual is
simultaneously presented with the choice of $100 immediately or $100 in one month, the
individual can make a choice for either reward. In general, it is more likely that the
individual will allocate a higher proportion of responses to the $100 immediately. Thus,
the perceived or subjective values of the two $100 options differ with the value of the
second $100 decreasing as a function of the delay. This is explained by Critchfield and
Kollins (2001) as the “weakening of consequence effects due to delay” (p. 102) and
referred to as temporal or delay discounting. The subjective value of the reward is
discounted as a result of a delay to the reward’s presentation.
This same discounting effect is demonstrated when the delayed reward also
differs in objective value (Myerson & Green, 1995). When choices are available between
rewards that differ in both immediacy and objective value, it is not as clear how
organisms are likely to allocate choices for either reward. For example, if an individual
is simultaneously presented with the choice of $100 immediately or $1,000 in one month,
the individual can make a choice for either reward. The subjective values of the two

!

1!

options, $100 versus $1,000, differ with the value of the $1,000 decreasing as a function
of the delay. In this example however, it is unclear how the diminished subjective value
of the $1,000 compares to the $100 because the rewards also differ in objective value.
One way to measure the subjective value of delayed rewards is by assessing
choice (Odum, 2011). In examining delay discounting, choice trials are presented
between small immediate rewards (typically referred to as smaller sooner rewards or
SSR) and larger delayed rewards (typically referred to as larger later rewards or LLR)
across a range of manipulations in delay to the LLR and amount of the SSR (Critchfield
& Kollins, 2001). For example, individuals might be asked to make repeated choices
between a range of SSR values (e.g., $0, $100, $300, $500, $800, $1,000) delivered
immediately and a constant LLR ($1,000) delivered after a range of delays (e.g., 1 week,
1 month, 1 year, 10 years) (see Table 1). Each SSR is paired with every delay for the
LLR. For example, individuals are asked to choose between $800 now versus $1,000
after waiting 1 month.
After a series of choice trials, indifference points are identified. An indifference
point is determined for each delay when a series of consistent choices (i.e., choice
responding) for the LLR is reversed to the SSR during ascending choice sequences and
vice versa for descending sequences. The magnitude of the SSR at the indifference point
is referred to as the subjective value of the LLR. For example, Table 1 illustrates an
indifference point identified at one month when a choice between $500 immediately
versus $1,000 in one year reverses choice responding from the LLR to the SSR. Thus,
the subjective value of the LLR is $500. Indifference points identified at each successive
delay determine if increasing delays are associated with discounted reward values.
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Each successive delay should show a lower subjective value of the LLR than the
previous resulting in a decreasing trend (Reed & Martens, 2011). For example, Tables 1
and 2 demonstrate decreasing trends in subjective value of LLR across increasing delays.
How steeply an individual discounts delayed rewards is relative to how immediately
!
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choice responding reverses from the LLR to the SSR in ascending choice sequences. For
example, indifference points are labeled with an asterisk in Table 1 identifying subjective
values of $1,000, $800, $500, and $300. The decreasing trend across these subjective
values demonstrates a discounting effect. Table 2 represents data that demonstrates a
larger or heavier discounting effect because choice responding reversed from the LLR to
the SSR at much lower reward magnitude across delays. Indifference points are labeled
with an asterisk in Table 2 identifying subjective values of $500, $300, $100, and $0.
The decreasing trend across these subjective values demonstrates a heavier discounting
effect compared to the effect demonstrated by the data in Table 1. The degree to which
an individual discounts delayed rewards when presented with a series of choice trials has
been related to the degree to which an individual discounts larger but delayed rewards in
daily life (Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Hoerger & Mace, 2006).
Temporal discounting procedures are a potentially useful tool in identifying
impulsive behavior. Impulsivity is typically assessed by indirect assessment measures
such as rating scales that rely on subjective report. The investigation of temporal
discounting procedures has facilitated the objective measurement of impulsive behavior
which is incompatible with the behavior of self-control. Some behavior analytic
researchers have operationally defined “impulsive” behavior as choices for SSR, and
“self-control” as choices for LLR (Ainslie, 1974; Critchfield & Kollins, 2001; Rachlin &
Green, 1972). That is, a pattern of choice responding for SSR indicates that an individual
engages in impulsive behavior, while a pattern of choice responding for LLR indicates
self-control.
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Consistent with conventional behavioral observations that behavior is determined
by past consequences (Critchfield & Kollins, 2001), different histories of impulsive
behavior have been related to discounting the value of delayed rewards more heavily
(Lane, Cherek, Rhoades, Pietras, & Tcheremissine, 2003; Mazur & Logue, 1978). For
example, one student may engage in off-task behaviors such as talking to peers instead of
completing independent work. Off-task behavior may result in immediate peer attention,
yet the larger delayed outcome of earning a good grade is potentially sacrificed. A
second student may choose to forgo talking with peers to receive a good grade. In this
example, the value of the good grade is subjectively valued differently by the two
students. The first student discounts the value of the delayed reward (good grade) more
heavily than the second student. An extensive learning history of engaging in impulsive
behavior may lead to more serious maladaptive behavior over time.
Impulsivity has been correlated to more extreme maladaptive behaviors such as
eating disorders, substance abuse, low academic success, and even suicide (Daugherty &
Brase, 2010; Kirby, Winston, & Santiesteban, 2005; Liu et al., 2013). It is also a core
diagnostic criterion across a range of diagnoses such as attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD), conduct disorder, and bipolar disorder (Broos et al., 2012; Moeller,
Barratt, Dougherty, Schmitz, & Swann, 2001). Additionally, impulsive behaviors
reported in childhood have also been linked to negative outcomes later in life. For
example, Sihvola et al. (2011) reported that behaviors associated with impulsivity in
younger years were significant predictors for substance abuse in adolescence. Thus, the
identification and treatment of impulsive choice responding may be critical at earlier
ages.
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Young children tend to choose SSR when offered concurrently with LLR
(Forzano & Logue, 1995; Logue & Chavarro, 1992). For example, young children in a
study conducted by Vollmer, Borrero, Lalli, and Daniel (1999) engaged in aggressive
behavior maintained by access to food and activities. The study demonstrated that even
after various manipulations such as differential reinforcement of alternative behavior
procedures were implemented, aggression occurred when it resulted in SSR even though
the alternative behavior resulted in LLR. Research has been conducted to investigate the
possibility of teaching individuals to make choices for LLR that are more advantageous
in time (Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988). Teaching children to make adaptive
choices such as compliance, completing assigned tasks, and making functional requests
involves teaching them to forgo engaging in behaviors that result in small sooner rewards
in favor of those resulting in larger later rewards (Stromer, McComas, & Rehfeldt, 2000).
Despite an evident need, there are few studies investigating procedures available to teach
children to choose delayed rewards (Binder, Dixon & Ghezzi, 2000).
The most widely investigated procedures to teach LLR choice responding to
children include concurrent activities (e.g., Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1972),
progressive delay schedule of reinforcement (e.g., Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988),
and a combination of the two procedures (e.g., Dixon & Cummings, 2001). A concurrent
activity may be described as a “distracting activity” during the delay (Binder et al., 2000,
p. 233). For example, concurrent activities used in recent studies have included verbal
and nonverbal activities. Participants have been instructed to engage in verbal concurrent
activities such as repetitiously reciting rules related to choosing the LLR or naming
objects on flashcards (Binder et al., 2000). Nonverbal concurrent activities have included
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placing foam cubes in a plastic basket (Dixon, Rehfeldt, & Randich, 2003) or physical
therapy exercises (e.g., Dixon & Falcomata, 2004).
Progressive delay procedures involve presentation of both the large and small
rewards immediately. Delivery of the larger reward is delayed gradually over time
(Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988). For example, progressive delay procedures begin
with the presentation of both choice options at 0 s and the delay associated with the larger
later reward increases by increments (e.g., 5 s) each time a predetermined criterion is
reached (Binder et al., 2000; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988). Dixon and Cummings
(2001) as well as Binder et al. (2000) investigated a combination of concurrent activities
and progressive delay procedures with positive results.
Further strategies considered to be possible treatments to increase LLR choice
responding are commitment and rules. Advance commitment to choose a larger delayed
reward has been primarily investigated in nonhuman research (Ainslie, 1974; Rachlin &
Green, 1972). Commitment is described by Rachlin and Green (1972) as strategies that
an organism engages in to make a predetermined choice allocation. The predetermined
commitment to a particular choice response renders the alternative option irrelevant
(Rachlin & Green, 1972). Although this is a strategy found in basic literature (Perrin &
Neef, 2012), authors such as Rachlin and Green (1972) propose that commitment may
explain concurrent activities self-imposed by children such as singing or counting during
a delay. An additional strategy to promote delay-to-reinforcement tolerance in children is
rule delivery (Abikoff & Gittelman, 1985). The strategy involves the delivery of a rule
by another (e.g., experimenter) or reciting rules to oneself (Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff,
1988) and has been described as “verbalizations that cue, direct, or maintain behavior”
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(Friedling & O’Leary, 1979). As Binder et al. (2000) discussed, there is a limited
empirical basis and procedures available to teach children to choose delayed rewards.
Purpose of the Study
Further investigation and development of procedures to teach children to choose
larger delayed rewards is necessary for two reasons. First, there are few studies that
investigate procedures to teach children to choose LLR, which, in turn, results in a lack of
empirically based strategies to choose from when teaching individuals to tolerate delayto-reinforcement. Second, although progressive delay and concurrent activities are
supported by the literature, it is critical that multiple treatment options are available.
Individualized treatment should be expected for all socially significant behaviors, and a
variety of treatment options may be necessary to maximize effectiveness at the individual
level. To meet these ends, a novel method to teach delay-to-reinforcement tolerance in
young children was investigated. This novel method, called a shifting delay procedure,
involved splitting the larger delayed reward into both an immediate and delayed reward,
and then gradually shifting the immediate portion to the delayed portion. The purpose of
this paper is two-fold. First, a literature review was conducted to identify teaching
procedures that have been investigated to increase choice allocation to larger later
rewards over smaller sooner rewards and compare methods employed across studies.
Second, the effects of a shifting delay procedure on choice allocation to SSR versus LLR
was investigated with six typically developing young children (ages 4 to 5-years).
Findings and directions for future research are discussed.
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Chapter 2
!

Literature Review
The social significance of addressing impulsivity has been well-established

considering its correlation to a variety of maladaptive behaviors. In children, impulsivity
is typically characterized by behaviors such as blurting out answers to questions or
cutting to the front of the line. In adolescence and young adults, impulsivity may be
characterized by behaviors such as tobacco use or reckless driving, and by similar
manifestations in adults such as gambling or reckless sexual behavior. A lack of
“impulse control” can affect social relationships, school or career success, and lead to
more harmful behaviors such as aggression, substance abuse, eating disorders, and
suicide (Daugherty & Brase, 2010; Kirby et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2013).
Impulsivity has traditionally been identified via indirect assessment methods.
Measures such as Likert scales, questionnaires, and rating scales are used to gather
information from the target individual as well as others familiar with the target individual
(e.g., caregivers, teachers). For example, an item on a self-report measure might include
“I act on impulse” (Moeller et al., 2001). The target individual might be expected to rate
his/her degree of impulsivity on a scale from 1 to 5. Thus, the identification and
subsequent treatment of impulsivity is based on patterns of reported behavior that are
inferred by researchers and practitioners.
There are significant limitations associated with relying on indirect assessment
methods to identify behavior and design treatment. Target behaviors are not directly
measured, instead, verbal report is measured and may not have any relationship to actual
behavior. The problem with subjective and possibly biased verbal report is that the data
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may not yield an accurate representation of true levels of behavior. Thus, indirect
assessment methods may result in unreliable and invalid data (Cooper et al., 2006). An
alternate and more accurate method of measuring behavior is direct assessment.
Direct measurement of behavior such as rate, duration, or latency relies on direct
observation and is used to measure actual behavior. A precise definition is formulated
that allows for direct observation of the actual behavior potentially providing more
accurate and precise information about the target behavior. Reliable and accurate data is
the keystone in the design of effective treatment.
Behavior analysts have targeted “impulsivity” via direct assessment methods.
Each instance of impulsive behavior may be conceptualized as a choice made for a less
favorable but more immediate consequence (SSR) over a more favorable but delayed
consequence (LLR). When an individual demonstrates a pattern of allocating choices to
SSR over LLR, behavior analysts identify such a pattern as impulsivity. Thus, behavior
analysts have assessed impulsivity by observing response patterns of choice allocation to
reinforcers on concurrent schedules of reinforcement. That is, when two reinforcers are
simultaneously presented, they are in direct competition and reinforcer effects for one
response are partially dependent on reinforcers available for other responses (Fisher &
Mazur, 1997; Martens, Lochner, & Kelly, 1992). This is true in the contexts of daily life.
For example, a college student can choose to study to increase the possibility of earning a
good grade. The value of the good grade may be a powerful reinforcer when reinforcers
are not simultaneously available for other responses. However, if a good grade is in
direct competition with reinforcers for alternate responses such as watching television
then the value of the good grade is likely weakened.
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Tasks investigating the weakening of consequence effects typically alter more
than one reinforcer dimension at one time (Cuvo, Lerch, Leurquin, Gaffaney, & Poppen,
1998). For example, a young boy may be expected to endure delays for larger rewards
such as waiting his turn for a toy. Engaging in impulsive behavior such as grabbing a toy
from a peer may result in immediate access to a toy; however, it is likely that the access
is limited when a teacher intervenes or the peer takes the toy back. Waiting for his turn
to play with the toy may result in a larger amount of time with the toy after tolerating the
delay to his turn. In this example, each response results in consequences that differ in
both magnitude and immediacy. Grabbing the toy from the peer would be considered an
impulsive choice for a smaller immediate gain while waiting his turn would be
considered demonstrating self-control for the more favorable delayed outcome.
Considering the effects that reinforcer dimensions such as immediacy and
magnitude have on behavior may be useful in the development of interventions to alter
impulsive patterns of choice responding (Neef & Lutz, 2001). For example, teaching an
individual to respond to reward magnitude over reward immediacy (i.e., waiting for a
larger delayed reward) may have important implications for individuals who exhibit
impulsive behavior. Procedures that reverse choice responding from SSR to LLR are
important to teaching an organism to tolerate delayed reinforcement. Behavioral
interventions to reduce impulsive choice responding have produced positive outcomes
but are not well established in the current body of literature. Procedures that have been
investigated to reverse impulsive choice responding include progressive (fading) delay,
concurrent activities, rules, commitment, reward linking and bundling, visual tools, pretrial response requirement, and conditioned reinforcement and exchange delays.
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The purpose of this review was to determine how researchers have approached the
development of treatments for teaching delay-to-reinforcement tolerance (i.e., selfcontrol choice responding) to nonhuman and human organisms. More specifically, this
review sought to identify teaching procedures that have been investigated to increase
LLR choice responding, describe the methods and outcomes associated with those
procedures, identify methodological concerns, and suggest directions for future research.
Each procedure will be examined separately.
Method
To identify articles investigating procedures designed to alter impulsive choice
responding (i.e., teach delay-to-reinforcement), four literature searches were conducted
using the databases PsycINFO and Wiley Library Online. The keywords were
“Temporal discounting” and “Teaching self-control” for the first search, “Temporal
discounting” and “Teaching delay-to-reinforcement” for the second search, “Delay
Discounting” and “Teaching self-control” for the third search, and “Delay Discounting”
and “Teaching delay-to-reinforcement” for the final search. Resulting peer-reviewed
articles were reviewed to meet the following inclusion and exclusion criteria. The
following inclusion criteria were used: the study must (a) focus on teaching an individual
to tolerate delay-to-reinforcement in the context of concurrent schedules and (b) provide
an operational definition of choice responding. Excluded were articles that (a) focused
solely on demonstrating the utility of quantitative models to fit participant data,
(b) compared quantitative models, (c) identified choice responding patterns associated
with specific diagnostic populations such as ADHD or maladaptive behaviors such as
substance abuse, or (d) defined impulsivity as cognitive, biological, or cognitive
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constructs. Of the retained articles, a search of the references was conducted and studies
that investigated procedures designed to alter choice responding were examined and the
inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied. A total of 22 studies were identified using
this search methodology.
Results
Participants. Of the 22 studies that met the inclusion criteria, the effects of
teaching procedures on choice responding were investigated with non-human participants
in seven studies and human participants in 15 studies. Non-human participants included
pigeons in six studies (Grosch & Neuringer, 1981; Jackson & Hackenberg, 1996; Mazur,
2012; Mazur & Logue, 1978; Rachlin & Green, 1972; Siegel & Rachlin, 1995) and rats in
two studies (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003; Mazur, 2012). Both pigeons and rats were
subjects in the Mazur (2012) study. Human participants included adults (ages 18 and
over) in eight studies (Benedick & Dixon, 2009; Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Falcomata,
2004; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al., 2003; Fisher, Bailey, & Willner, 2012;
Hyten, Madden, & Field, 1994; Kirby & Guastello, 2001); children (ages 8 – 12 years) in
one study (Vollmer et al., 1999); young children (ages 3 – 7 years) in five studies (Binder
et al., 2000; Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Gokey, Wilder, Welch, Collier, & Mathisen,
2013; Newquist, Dozier, & Neidert, 2012; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988); and ages
were not reported in one study utilizing a group design (Bailey, Willner, & Dymond,
2011). Of the 15 studies with human participants, one study included participants
considered “typical” (Newquist et al., 2012), 11 studies included individuals with
diagnoses such as autism, intellectual disability, or mental health impairments (Bailey et
al., 2011; Benedick & Dixon, 2009; Binder et al., 2000; Dixon & Cummings, 2001;
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Dixon & Falcomata, 2004; Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al.,
2003; Fisher et al., 2012; Gokey et al., 2013; Vollmer et al., 1999); one study included
participants who were rated as impulsive by teachers (Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff,
1988); and diagnostic information was not reported in two studies (Hyten et al., 1994;
Kirby & Guastello, 2001). Across the 22 studies identified for this review, there are a
wide range of ages and populations investigated. Although the external validity of
procedures is increased, the empirical basis for the use of the following interventions with
a specific age or population group is limited.
Methods and outcomes. The primary teaching goal across the 22 studies was to
increase self-control choice responding meaning that a higher proportion of choices were
allocated to the LLR. Several studies additionally investigated treatment effects on
increasing additional desired target behaviors (Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Falcomata,
2004) or decreasing problem behaviors (Dixon & Cummings, 2001). For example, one
study measured increases in concurrent physical therapy exercises (e.g., open hand) in an
adult with acquired brain injury (Dixon & Falcomata, 2004). Dixon et al. (1998)
identified desired target behaviors (e.g., in-seat) for each participant and measured the
effects of a combined progressive delay/concurrent activity procedure on respective
behaviors. Dixon and Cummings (2001) measured effects on decreasing problem
behavior (e.g., self-injury).
Two out of the 22 studies included temporal discounting procedures associated
with hypothetical rewards (Bailey et al., 2011; Fisher et al., 2012). Rewards were
delivered for each choice in the form of hypothetical monetary rewards added on a visual
calculator, but real monetary rewards were not delivered. One out of the 22 studies
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delivered real rewards at the end of the session for one choice from a series of choices
(Kirby & Guastello, 2001). The other 19 studies included in this review delivered real
rewards for each choice.
Researchers investigated the effects of progressive delay in 11 studies, concurrent
activities in 9 studies, rules in 2 studies, visual tools in 4 studies, commitment in 2
studies, reward linking and bundling in 2 studies, and various combinations of these
procedures in 10 studies. Some studies investigated combined treatment effects;
however, each procedure was included in all treatment categories that met the procedural
definition. For example, if a study investigated a treatment package including progressive
delay and concurrent activity procedures, then the study was included in both treatment
categories. Although the procedures can be grouped into these broader categories, the
methods used across studies vary significantly.
Progressive delay. Eleven out of 22 studies included in this review examined
progressive delay procedures (see Table 3). Ten out of the 11 studies that examined
progressive delay utilized the same general procedures of presenting both smaller and
larger rewards immediately and then gradually increasing the delay or duration of task
engagement to the larger reward. One of the 11 studies examined an inverse of typical
progressive delay procedures by presenting both smaller and larger rewards after a delay
and gradually decreasing the delay to the SSR (Mazur & Logue, 1978).
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Two out of the 11 studies investigated progressive delay as an independent
treatment (Mazur & Logue, 1978; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988), whereas 8 out of
11 studies investigated progressive delay and concurrent activities as a treatment package
(Binder et al., 2000; Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Dixon & Falcomata, 2004; Dixon et al.,
1998; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al., 2003; Gokey et al., 2013; Vollmer et al.,
1999). When progressive delay was examined as an independent treatment, the delay
was gradually altered and the experimenter did not provide access to activities or items
during the delay. When progressive delay procedures were investigated as a component
of a treatment package, the delay to the larger reward was gradually increased but the
experimenter presented a required task or access to a preferred activity/tangible during
the delay. When task engagement was required (e.g., physical therapy exercises), the
duration of time that the participant was required to engage in the task as well as delay to
the larger reward was gradually increased. That is, there was both an increase in
response effort as well as an increase in delay requirement.
The specific procedures used across studies, however, varied widely in three
significant ways including inconsistent initial delays, different methods of calculating
delay goals, and varied methods of incrementally increasing the delay lengths.
Inconsistent initial delays. The initial delay is the delay at which the larger
reward is presented at the onset of the progressive delay procedure. Seven out of 11
studies reported that the initial delay to the larger reward was 0 s (Benedick & Dixon,
2009; Dixon & Falcomata, 2004; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al., 2003; Gokey et
al., 2013; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988; Vollmer et al., 1999). For example, both
the smaller and larger rewards were initially available immediately. One study reported
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alternate initial delay requirements. Dixon and Cummings (2001) set the initial delay as
the average of each participant’s natural baseline waiting duration. In the natural baseline
condition, the larger reward was placed in view of the participant who was told to wait as
long as possible without eating/playing with the reward. The amount of time that the
participant waited was recorded across trials until it was relatively stable. The mean
length of waiting across trials conducted in this condition was then set as the initial delay
for the larger reinforcer. For example, if the mean of the participant’s natural baseline
trials was calculated at 12 s, then the initial delay for the larger reinforcer was set at 12 s.
Two of the 11 studies did not report the initial delay (Binder et al., 2000; Dixon et al.,
1998). As mentioned previously, Mazur and Logue (1978) implemented an initial delay
to both the smaller and larger rewards at 6 s.
Different methods of calculating delay goals. The delay goal is the maximum
time requirement for access to the larger delayed item which is calculated to demonstrate
a clinically significant increase in baseline waiting time or duration of task engagement
(Dixon & Holcomb, 2000). None of the studies reviewed provided a rationale for the
calculation method used to determine the delay goal. Six of 11 studies calculated the
delay goal by multiplying the mean baseline waiting time or mean duration of baseline
task engagement for each participant by an arbitrary number. The authors did not
provide a rationale for number choice. Four studies calculated the delay goal by
multiplying the mean baseline waiting time by 3 (Binder et al., 2000), 5 (Dixon et al.,
2003), or 12 (Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Gokey et al., 2013); two studies calculated the
delay goal by multiplying the mean duration of baseline task engagement (e.g., physical
therapy exercise) by 7 (Dixon & Holcomb, 2000) or 10 (Dixon & Falcomata, 2004).
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Benedick and Dixon (2009) calculated the delay goal for each participant based
on patterns of choice responding during the choice baseline condition of the study. Each
session during choice baseline consisted of eight choice trials. Choice responding was
measured across a range of delays and three sessions of choice trials were conducted at
each delay. Based on choice baseline data, the delay goal for each participant was
identified as the longest delay goal that was associated with either of two criterion that
was satisfied. Criteria one was used to identify the delay goal if choice baseline yielded a
pattern of choice responding for the LLR that remained constant at four consecutive
delays. If criteria one was met, the longest delay associated with consistent choice
responding for LLR was used as the goal. Criteria two was used to identify the delay
goal if choice baseline yielded a pattern of choice responding for SSR and the percentage
of choices for LLR was below 10% on two of three consecutive delays. If criteria two
was met, the longest delay associated with consistent choice responding for SSR was
used as the goal. The delay goal was set as the longest delay identified by the two
calculations. Mazur and Logue (1978) reported a delay goal of 6 s and Dixon et al.
(1998) reported a delay goal of 5 min but neither reported the method used to derive this
goal. Schweitzer and Sulzer-Azaroff (1988) and Vollmer et al. (1999) did not report a
delay goal and continued training until the sessions were ended due to variables such as
time constraints or a pattern of choice responding for the SSR.
Incrementally increasing delay lengths. Progressive delay procedures begin with
an equal or near equal initial delay to both the smaller and larger reward. After the
subject reaches a criterion for stability (i.e., LLR chosen on four out of five trials or two
consecutive trials at each delay), which varied slightly across studies, the delay to the
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larger reward is gradually increased in increments (e.g., 5 s). Only four out of the 11
studies set a constant incremental increase or decrease in duration of waiting at 0.25 s to
0.5 s (Mazur & Logue, 1978), 2 s to 3 s (Binder et al., 2000), 5 s (Schweitzer & SulzerAzaroff, 1988), or 10 s (Benedick & Dixon, 2009; Dixon & Falcomata, 2004). Four out
of 12 progressive delay studies reported that the delay was “gradually increased” without
specifying the quantitative value (Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Dixon et
al., 2003; Vollmer et al., 1999).
Two out of 11 studies reported incremental increases in task engagement. One of
the studies increased task engagement by a constant 60 s to 90 s increment (Dixon &
Holcomb, 2000). Another study calculated 12% of the delay goal for each participant
and increased task engagement based on the calculation (Gokey et al., 2013). For
example, if the delay goal was calculated to be 120 s then the delay to the larger reward
would gradually increase by 14.4 s. It is important to note that Dixon and Hayes (1998)
reported the use of an adjusting delay in which choice allocation for SSR during the first
choice trial after an incremental increase in delay resulted in a decrease during the next
session of trials. Of the studies that examined progressive delay procedures, this was the
only study that reported both delay increases and decreases contingent on choice
response.
In summary, outcomes across all studies investigating progressive delay are
considered positive as they demonstrate patterns of increased delay-to-reinforcement
tolerance and self-control choice responding. The majority of studies reported increased
choice responding for the LLR across all participants relative to baseline levels (Benedick
& Dixon, 2009; Binder et al., 2000; Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Dixon & Falcomata,
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2004; Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al., 2003; Gokey et al.,
2013; Vollmer et al., 1999) or control subjects (Mazur & Logue, 1978). One study
reported a reverse in choice responding for LLR in five out of six participants
(Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988). Two out of 11 studies reported increased selfcontrol choice responding (Benedick & Dixon, 2009; Binder et al., 2000; Gokey et al.,
2013); whereas five different studies reported significant effects of progressive delay
procedures on additional target behaviors such as group engagement, physical therapy
exercises, and in-seat behavior (Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Falcomata, 2004; Dixon &
Holcomb, 2000) as well as decreased problem behaviors such as self-injury (Dixon &
Cummings, 2001; Vollmer et al., 1999).
Progressive delay procedures are considered to be effective in increasing selfcontrol choice responding, increasing cooperative behaviors, and decreasing problem
behaviors according to the current body of literature. However, there are several
limitations surrounding the investigation of this procedure. First, progressive delay
procedures are not widely used without additional treatment components such as
concurrent activities. Out of the 12 studies investigating progressive (fading) delay, two
studies investigated effects independent of other treatments (Mazur & Logue, 1978;
Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988). As a result, the effectiveness of progressive delay
as an independent procedure is not well established. Second, the utility of progressive
delay procedures specific to age or diagnostic groups is not clear. Progressive delay
procedures have been investigated across a wide range of age and diagnostic populations.
Repeated replications of outcomes are not well established in any particular population.
Third, and similar to the previous point, replication of methods across progressive delay
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procedures is limited. As discussed, variability in methods such as calculation of initial
delay, delay goal, and delay increase/decrease limits the empirical basis of progressive
delay treatment as standardized procedures have not been established.
Several important implications may be drawn from these results. Positive
outcomes are reported across studies that investigated progressive delay procedures;
however, many parameters related to the use of the procedures are unclear. First,
progressive delay procedures are considered to be one of the primary treatments effective
for altering impulsive choice responding. However, it has only been investigated
independent of other procedures in two studies. It is unclear whether progressive delay
procedures are effective independent of other procedures or if a combination of
procedures is necessary. Second, progressive delay procedures that gradually increase
task requirements may demonstrate a different effect compared to procedures that
gradually increase delay alone. Progressive procedures that gradually increase task
requirements are, in actuality, gradually increasing both delay and response effort. It is
unclear whether the treatment effects are different when the reward is associated with
delay and response effort versus delay alone. Third, as discussed previously, the methods
used across progressive delay procedures varied significantly across parameters such as
initial delay, calculation of a delay goal, and increasing delay increments. This is a
problem because it is unclear which parameters are necessary for effective treatment. For
example, delay goals were calculated by multiplying natural baseline waiting durations
by 12 with young children (Dixon & Cummings, 2001) and 3 with adults (Binder et al.,
2000). It is possible that multiplying the delay goal by 12 contributes to successful
treatment for young children. Without justification of this method and further replication,
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it is unclear whether parameters similar to this are necessary to the effectiveness of the
procedure for specific ages or populations.
!

Concurrent activities. Activities provided during delay requirements are

considered highly effective in altering choice responding from SSR to LLR. These are
distractor activities that the participant engages in during the delay to the larger reward.
Different types of concurrent activities have been investigated including both verbal and
physical activities. For the purposes of this review, verbal activity will only be
considered to be a concurrent activity if it occurred for the entire delay. For example, a
statement that is repeated for the entirety of the delay will be considered a concurrent
activity. However, a statement that is made at the beginning of the delay but not repeated
will not be considered a concurrent activity. One study investigated verbal concurrent
activities and included either a rule statement or random statement that was repeated
throughout the delay to the LLR (Binder et al., 2000). The rule statement repeated
throughout the delay included “If I wait a little longer, I will get the bigger one.” The
random statement included “Black table, wobble, green.” Physical concurrent activities
required either engagement in a neutral task (e.g., sorting stimuli) or a targeted response
requirement (e.g., physical therapy exercise).
Providing a concurrent task during the delay has reliably been demonstrated to
increase choice of LLR. Significant effects have been demonstrated across different ages
and populations. However, this procedure has not been replicated within each age or
population to an acceptable degree. For example, differential responding was
demonstrated with an adult with a brain injury in one study (Dixon & Falcomata, 2004);
groups of adults with mental health impairments and intellectual disabilities in one study
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(Dixon & Holcomb, 2000); adults with intellectual disabilities in one study (Dixon et al.,
2003); adults with developmental disabilities in one study (Dixon et al., 1998); typically
developing young children in one study (Newquist et al., 2012); young children with
autism in two studies (Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Gokey et al., 2013); and pigeons in one
study (Grosch & Neuringer, 1981). The wide range of ages and populations investigated
increases generality of these procedures, yet limits the empirical basis for the use of this
intervention with a specific age or population group. Out of the 22 studies reviewed, nine
implemented some form of concurrent activity during the delay that varied by type of
activity and required response effort (see Table 4).
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Type of activity. First, the type of activity that was implemented during the delay
was significantly different across studies. Three studies included a required task such as
sorting manipulatives (Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Dixon et al., 2003; Gokey et al.,
2013); two studies offered optional activities during the delay such as availability of a
preferred toy (Grosch & Neuringer, 1981; Newquist et al., 2012); four studies included a
required response such as physical therapy exercise (Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon &
Falcomata, 2004; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon & Horner, 2003); and one study
required verbal responses such as a participant rule statement repeated for the duration of
the delay (Binder et al., 2000). Second, out of the eight studies that included more than
one participant, two studies reported different activities across participants (Dixon et al.,
1998; Gokey et al., 2013) and six studies required the same activity across participants
(Binder et al., 2000; Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al.,
2003; Grosch & Neuringer, 1981; Newquist et al., 2012). For example, Dixon et al.
(2003) implemented the same activity across participants in the form of placing foam
cubes into a basket. Gokey et al. (2013) conducted a preference assessment to identify a
concurrent activity for each participant. The activities identified included sorting blocks
by shape, sorting bear figurines by color, and completing handwriting worksheets.
Although this is the only study that reported identifying the concurrent activity via a
preference assessment, it demonstrates the range of activities possible within a single
study.
Different activities across participants may be considered a significant limitation
in the two studies included in this review that investigated different concurrent activities
across participants using a multiple baseline across participants design (Dixon et al.,
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1998; Gokey et al., 2013). Multiple baseline design relies on the logic that the
independent variable’s effect on the dependent variable is demonstrated by a lack of
change in the dependent variable in untreated conditions, while change is observed in the
dependent variable as the independent variable is applied in a stepwise fashion. The
design requires the use of multiple baselines across behaviors of one participant, settings
for one participant, or participants (multiple individuals); however, a change in two of
these parameters simultaneously would not result in a demonstration of experimental
control. Dixon et al. (1998) and Gokey et al. (2013) examined the effects of a combined
treatment (progressive delay and concurrent activities) on choice responding. A
significant limitation associated with these studies is that multiple baselines were applied
across participants and target behaviors (of multiple individuals) simultaneously. It is
unclear whether changes in behavior are solely due to treatment and not the result of
unknown variables related to different task requirements across participants. The internal
validity of the studies is compromised and results should be interpreted with caution.
Response effort. The different types of concurrent activities investigated varied
based on the amount of response effort required to access the larger reward. For
example, presentation of a preferred toy (Newquist et al., 2012) or a preferred activity
(i.e., sorting stimuli) (Gokey et al., 2013) requires much less response effort than
participation in a difficult task (e.g., physical therapy exercise) (Dixon & Falcomata,
2004). Variability in response effort associated with concurrent activities may be an
important dimension to consider in light of the lack of replication with any particular type
of activity that has been investigated. The effectiveness of an intervention to alter choice
responding may be different when delayed rewards are subjectively weakened by delay
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compared to delay and response effort. That is, an individual may discount delayed
rewards more heavily if the reward is both delayed and requires increased effort to obtain
it. As a result, the effects of an intervention may be less effective when the reward is
discounted more heavily as a function of delay and response effort to obtain the reward
compared to delay alone.
In summary, outcomes across studies investigating concurrent activities are
considered positive as they demonstrate patterns of increased delay-to-reinforcement
tolerance, self-control choice responding, cooperative behaviors such as physical therapy
exercises, and decreased problem behaviors such as disruptive behavior. Five out of the
nine studies reported increased self-control choice responding (Binder et al., 2000; Gokey
et al., 2013; Grosch & Neuringer, 1981; Newquist et al., 2012); while four different
studies reported significant effects of concurrent activity procedures on additional target
behaviors such as increased group engagement, physical therapy exercises, and in-seat
behavior (Dixon et al., 1998; Dixon & Falcomata, 2004; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000) as
well as decreased problem behaviors such as self-injury (Dixon & Cummings, 2001).
Binder et al. (2000) specifically investigated whether the type of verbal activity had
differential effects on choice responding. The authors concluded that rule statements
versus random statements as defined above did not differentially affect responding
indicating that the type of verbal activity is not a significant factor.
Concurrent activity procedures are considered to be an effective intervention to
increase self-control choice responding, increase cooperative behaviors such as physical
therapy exercises, and decrease problem behavior such as self-injury. However, there are
limitations surrounding the investigation of this procedure. First, concurrent activity
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procedures are not widely used without additional treatment components such as
progressive delay procedures. Out of the nine studies investigating concurrent activities,
only one of the studies investigated the effects of the procedure independent of other
treatments (Newquist et al., 2012). As a result, the effectiveness of concurrent activities
as an independent procedure is not widely established. It is important to note that there is
a significant limitation related to the concurrent activity condition in the Newquist et al.
(2012) study. In the toy play condition, a choice for LLR resulted in access to a preferred
toy. In temporal discounting procedures, at least two choice options exist including a
smaller reward immediately or a larger reward after a delay. A concurrent activity is a
distractor activity that is provided during the delay to the larger reward to increase delayto-reinforcement tolerance until the reward is delivered. However, there was no reward
delivered after the delay in the toy play condition. The authors described the condition as
a temporal discounting task involving a choice between SSR and LLR. However, the toy
play condition did not present a choice between SSR versus LLR with a toy available as a
concurrent activity. Instead there was a choice between two SSR or reinforcers available
immediately. The SSR was four edible items available immediately and the “LLR” was
5 min access to a preferred toy also available immediately. The contingencies associated
with the “LLR” do not reflect a temporal discounting procedure as there is no weakening
effect of the larger reward due to delay. This limitation further adds to the paucity of
literature supporting concurrent activities in the form of preferred tangibles.
Second, similar to progressive delay procedures, the utility of concurrent activities
specific to age or diagnostic groups is not clear. Concurrent activity procedures have
been investigated across a range of age and diagnostic populations; however, replication
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of outcomes is not well established in any particular population. Third, replication of
methods (i.e., the type of activity or response effort) across concurrent activity
procedures is limited.
Two implications may be drawn from the reviewed literature on concurrent
activities. Positive outcomes are reported across studies that investigated concurrent
activities; however, many parameters related to the use of the procedures are unclear.
First, concurrent activities are considered to be one of the primary treatments effective for
altering impulsive choice responding. However, it has only been investigated
independent of other procedures in one study making it unclear whether concurrent
activities are effective alone or if the combination of concurrent activities and progressive
delay is necessary. Second, the type of concurrent activity varies widely across studies.
The effects of concurrent activities in the form of preferred tangibles (e.g., access to
preferred toy) compared to a task requiring higher levels of response effort (e.g., physical
therapy exercises) may result in different treatment effects. This is a problem because it
is unclear which types of tasks are effective in altering choice responding independent of
progressive delay procedures.
Rules. A rule is broadly defined as a statement that signals it is better to pick one
choice option over the other. Various forms of rules were investigated although methods
differed in two significant ways. Two out of 22 total studies included in this review
investigated self-stated rules by the participant and an experimenter rule (Newquist et al.,
2012), as well as a combination of a self-stated rule and written rule (Benedick & Dixon,
2009). Participants included young children with no diagnosis (Newquist et al., 2012)
and adults with a dual-diagnosis of mental illness and intellectual disability (Benedick &
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Dixon, 2009). Methods across the two studies differed by rule type, social mediation,
placement of the rule, and outcomes.
First, the type of rule differed across studies. A self-stated rule was investigated
by Newquist et al. (2012) as well as Benedick and Dixon (2009). Newquist et al. (2012)
defined a “child rule” as a brief statement indicating the LLR choice as the better option.
The participant was taught to say the rule after the choice was allocated to the LLR. For
example, when the LLR was chosen the child stated, “When I wait, I get four pieces”
once after the delay. Experimenter rule was also investigated and included a statement
by the experimenter, “When you wait, you get four pieces” once after the delay when the
LLR was chosen. In the Benedick and Dixon (2009) study, a written rule combined with
participant rule was investigated. The Rule condition consisted of choice options
between SSR and LLR each associated with a discriminative stimulus. Prior to the
presentation of each choice, a written rule was presented to the participant that stated, “It
is better to pick the green card” indicating the LLR (associated with green discriminative
stimulus) as the better choice option. The participant was required to read the rule out
loud. It is unclear whether self-stated, experimenter, or written rules result in different
choice responding patterns.
Second, social mediation associated with the rule may be important to its
effectiveness. Because rules varied by type across the two studies, delivery of the rule by
the experimenter (Newquist et al., 2012) versus a self-stated rule by the participant may
yield different results. For example, the attention associated with the experimenter
delivered rule may affect responding differently than a self-stated rule by the participant
that is not socially mediated. The same is true with the addition of the written rule, the
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combination of a written rule and a self-stated rule may affect choice responding
differently than a self-stated rule alone.
Third, the temporal placement of the rule may be important to patterns of choice
responding. In the Newquist et al. (2012) study, the rule was delivered after the choice
was made. Whereas the rule was delivered prior to the presentation of the choice option
in the Benedick and Dixon (2009) study. The placement of the rule may demonstrate
different effects on choice responding as a rule delivered prior to the choice option
functions as an antecedent manipulation while a rule delivered after the choice response
functions as a consequence. An antecedent rule may alter the likelihood of choice
allocation to either SSR or LLR; however, a consequence rule may alter the probability
that the individual will allocate choice to either SSR or LLR during future choice trials.
That is, consequence rules may alter overall patterns of choice responding.
The two studies investigating rules resulted in different outcomes. Benedick and
Dixon (2009) reported positive outcomes associated with delivery of a written rule
combined with a self-stated participant rule. This study also combined rule delivery with
a progressive delay procedure. Both the rule and no rule conditions consisted of a choice
between a smaller immediate reinforcer and a larger reinforcer associated with a
progressive increase in delay. The authors reported that results demonstrated choice
reversal to the LLR following training and the addition of rule delivery enhanced these
effects. However, treatment effects were not observed in the no rule condition which was
associated with only a progressive delay procedure. That is, a progressive delay
procedure alone did not result in a significant change in choice responding for LLR. The
addition of rule delivery to the progressive delay procedure resulted in significant
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increases in choice responding for the LLR. It is possible that the rule primarily
influenced choice responding or that a combination of procedures is necessary. The other
study investigating rule delivery reported that providing brief rules was ineffective for
increasing self-control choice responding (Newquist et al., 2012).
In summary, there are several limitations and implications that may be drawn
related to the effectiveness of rule delivery according to the literature included in this
review. Three limitations surrounding the investigation of this procedure are discussed.
First, only two studies investigated the utility of rule delivery and one of the studies
investigated the effects of a rule in combination with progressive delay. As a result,
support for the effects of rule delivery is limited. Second, the methods used across the
two studies varied by type of rule, social mediation, and temporal placement of the rule.
These differences in methods are significant considering a lack of research investigating
rule delivery on choice responding and further limits the replication of procedures when
using rules to alter choice responding. Third, the two studies investigated rules across
different ages (young children versus adults) and populations (typically developing
versus mental health impairment plus intellectual disability). Further replication is
warranted considering the mixed outcomes associated with the limited investigation of
this procedure.
Two implications based on this literature are discussed. First, the effectiveness of
rule delivery as a treatment procedure is unclear. The addition of rule delivery to a
progressive delay procedure resulted in a change of choice responding for LLR in the
Benedick and Dixon (2009) study. However, rule delivery did not have an effect on
choice responding in the Newquist et al. (2012) study. As a result, a clear conclusion
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regarding the effectiveness of rule delivery cannot be drawn. Second, it is unclear
whether rule delivery alone or a combination of procedures including rule delivery may
be effective in changing choice responding. In the Benedick and Dixon (2009) study, a
progressive delay procedure alone did not result in a significant change in choice
responding for LLR. However, the addition of rule delivery to the progressive delay
procedure resulted in significant increases in choice responding for LLR. It is unclear
whether this change can be attributed to rule delivery alone or the combination of rule
delivery (written and self-stated) plus progressive delay procedures. Third, it is unclear
whether one type of rule or a combination of rule types is necessary to alter choice
responding. In the Benedick and Dixon (2009) study, a written rule was presented in
combination with a self-stated rule. Results of the study indicated that this combination
of rule delivery was effective at increasing LLR choice responding; however, it is unclear
whether the rule types alone would be effective or this combination of rule delivery is
necessary. The Newquist et al. (2012) study investigated self-stated rules and
experimenter rules as independent treatments. Neither of the rule types altered choice
responding. The significant increase in choice responding observed in the Benedick and
Dixon (2009) study warrants further investigation of the components and parameters
necessary to the effectiveness of this treatment.
Commitment. Commitment involves allocation of choice to SSR or LLR before
the choice option is presented. The predetermined choice binds the subject to one option
removing the alternate reward as an option. That is, once a commitment is made to
choose the LLR then the SSR is no longer an option. Commitment procedures have
primarily been investigated in nonhuman research. Two out of 22 studies included in this
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review investigated commitment procedures. Rachlin and Green (1972) investigated the
effects of a commitment response on impulsive choice responding. Pigeons were
presented with a choice option of SSR (2 s access to grain) available immediately versus
LLR (4 s access to grain) after a delay (4 s). However, subjects were presented with an
opportunity to commit to a choice for either reward 6 s before the choice option was
presented. Choice allocation reversed to the LLR when a commitment to the LLR was an
option. The temporal distance from the commitment to the presentation of the choice
trial was identified as a significant variable related to choice allocation. Choice
responding remained consistent for SSR when the duration between the commitment and
choice option was short and reversed to consistent choice responding for LLR when the
choice option was further delayed from the commitment.
Siegel and Rachlin (1995) investigated a “soft commitment” procedure with
pigeons involving the generation of patterns of choice responding using schedules of
reinforcement. A mathematical equation can be used to predict when choice allocation
will reverse to the opposite pattern of choice responding during a calculated time period.
Thus, choice allocation can be reversed to LLR at any point during the interval. Within
the study, self-control choice responding was exhibited if the subject did not switch from
LLR choice responding to SSR choice responding. The soft commitment procedure was
designed to alter choice responding to the LLR by generating momentum of choice
responding for LLR resulting in a resistance to reversing choice to SSR.
In summary, commitment strategies show promise for increasing self-control
choice responding. However, evidence of its effectiveness is heavily embedded in
nonhuman research. Although nonhuman research is often the foundation of effective
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methodologies, interventions, and data analysis, generalization of results to humans and
applied settings are limited (Lerman, 2003). Additional research is needed to identify,
refine, and develop effective practices for use in applied settings. As a result, the use of
commitment strategies to alter choice responding is promising with nonhuman subjects,
but warrants further investigation to establish its utility in both nonhuman and human
populations.
Reward linking and bundling. Two out of 22 studies included in this review
investigated two procedures based on the principle that current choices are predictive of
future choices (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003; Kirby & Guastello, 2001). Ainslie and
Monterosso (2003) investigated the effects of a bundling rewards procedure with rats.
Eight rats were exposed to two conditions with differing amounts of sucrose solution
associated with SSR and LLR. Choice presentation of a range of smaller amounts (25 to
150 ml) of a sucrose solution was associated with immediate availability and a bundled
amount of sucrose (3 reinforcer deliveries of 150 ml) was available after a delay. On
each choice trial, both choice options were available. The results indicated that choice
responding for LLR was greater when the chosen reward included multiple reward
deliveries that are linked (bundled) compared to when rewards are chosen during single
choice trials resulting in reward delivery after each choice.
Kirby and Guastello (2001) investigated a procedure based on similar principles
of predictive behavior. The study investigated whether impulsive choice responding for
SSR would reverse when rewards were presented in a linked series. Choice trials
consisted of a series of smaller rewards paired with a series of larger rewards. For
example, a choice trial may consist of the option between: $5 today, in 10 days, 20 days,
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30 days, and 40 days or $10 in 16 days, 26 days, 36 days, and 46 days. Choice options
were presented within different formats including imposed linking (rewards directly
bundled by experimenter), suggested linking (indirect suggestion of reward bundling by
experimenter), and free linking (participant bundled rewards) but were all based on the
same basic premise. The authors reported that one-third of the participants reversed
choice responding to LLR when rewards were presented within a series of choices that
were directly bundled by the experimenter (imposed bundling) indicating that participants
made current choices based on the prediction of future choices. One limitation of the
Kirby and Guastello (2001) study is the report of positive outcomes despite the large
number of participants for which the procedure was not effective. If the reported
probability of a treatment’s ineffectiveness is higher than it’s effectiveness, then there is
likelihood that the procedure will not be effective in practice. If the procedure is
implemented as a treatment and is ineffective in changing behavior, then further
treatment options are necessary.
In summary, reward linking and bundling procedures have implications worthy of
further investigation. First, both of the studies investigating either reward linking or
bundling reported positive results for increasing self-control choice responding; however,
these effects have only been demonstrated in basic studies limiting their use in applied
setting or situations. Thus, both of these procedures warrant further investigation.
Second, it was reported in the Kirby and Guastello (2001) study that one-third of the
participants altered choice responding when choices were presented within the series
(reward linking). The results have positive implications for reward linking procedures in
some participants (approximately 24); however, there was a much larger proportion of
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individuals for which reward linking did not alter choice responding (approximately 48).
The significantly higher proportion of individuals for whom the procedure was
ineffective compared to those for whom it was effective largely limits the external
validity of the findings.
Visual tools. Four out of 22 studies included in this review investigated the use of
visual aids that represented either calculated rewards (Bailey et al., 2011; Fisher et al.,
2012) or indicated the amount of time elapsed during a delay (Newquist et al., 2012;
Vollmer et al., 1999). Two of the four studies investigated the effects of a visual decision
making tool on impulsive choice responding within group designs. One study reported
that participants were adults with intellectual disabilities (Fisher et al., 2012) while the
other study reported that participants attended day services for individuals with learning
disabilities but did not report the age range of participants (Bailey et al., 2011). The
visual aid investigated in the Bailey et al. (2011) study was referred to as a visual
calculator that consisted of green bars (marked with 2, 4, 6, 8, or 10 smiley faces)
representing rewards and red bars (1, 2, 4, 7, or 14 smiley faces) representing waiting
time. The size of the bars represented their values. The same visual calculator methods
were followed across both studies (Fisher et al., 2012). The authors reported that the
visual calculator investigated in both studies resulted in more orderly data patterns and
decreased impulsive choice responding in the Fisher et al. (2012) study. The primary
difference between the two studies was that the temporal discounting tasks used to
measure impulsive choice responding was administered in a paper-and-pencil format in
one study (Fisher et al., 2012); whereas, it was administered via a computer program in
the other study (Bailey et al., 2011). It is unknown whether the visual calculator also
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differed in format across the two studies (computer-based vs. manipulative based). If so,
it is possible that individuals may not be as proficient when using the manipulative
compared to a computer program.
Two out of 4 studies investigated the effects of a visual countdown timer during
the delay to LLR. Vollmer et al. (1999) investigated the use of a countdown timer during
the delay to LLR for a child with autism. A digital timer was placed in the participant’s
view and signaled the delay-to-reinforcement. The timer was combined with a
progressive delay procedure. The authors reported that signaling delay-to-reinforcement
by means of a countdown timer increased self-control choice responding. In the
Newquist et al. (2012) study, a time delivery condition was implemented independent of
other interventions and defined as the experimenter starting the countdown timer and
placing it in front of the participant. The authors reported that providing a countdown
timer during the delay to the larger reward did not increase delay-to-reinforcement
tolerance. The administration methods used in the two studies were very similar with the
exception of the visual timer used in combination with another treatment in one study
(Vollmer et al., 1999) and an independent treatment in the other (Newquist et al., 2012).
In summary, visual aids have reported positive outcomes overall. However, there
were significant differences across the studies. First, the form of visual aid was different
between the studies. A visual calculator and visual countdown timer serve two different
functions. The calculator is a visual representation of rewards earned and lost; whereas,
the countdown timer is a visual representation signaling delay-to-reinforcement. With
two different purposes, the visual aids may also produce different effects on choice
responding. Second, the use of a visual countdown timer was reported as effective in one
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study (Vollmer et al., 1999) and ineffective in the other (Newquist et al., 2012). The
most significant difference between the studies is that the timer was investigated
independently in the Newquist et al. (2012) study whereas it was investigated in
combination with a progressive delay procedure in the Vollmer et al. (1999) study.
There are two implications that may be drawn from the limited body of literature
investigating the utility of visual aids. First, it is unclear how much influence the
countdown timer had on choice responding independent of progressive delay procedures
when positive outcomes were reported. One study reported positive outcomes related to
the use of a countdown timer, however, it was used in combination with a progressive
delay procedure (Vollmer et al., 1999). Considering that progressive delay procedures
are considered to be one of the most effective treatments for increasing self-control
choice responding, it is unclear whether the use of a countdown timer would be effective
in isolation or whether the combination of the timer and progressive delay is necessary.
Second, the two studies that investigated the utility of a visual calculator presented
temporal discounting tasks that provided hypothetical rewards. The participants
experienced the monetary rewards in digital format but did not receive the SSR or LLR
corresponding with the response for each choice trial. It is possible that patterns of
choice responding would be different if each choice resulted in delivery of real
consequences. This is particularly relevant if the participants do not have past
experiences with the delays and reward amounts presented in the task.
Pre-trial response requirement. One of the 22 studies included in this review
investigated the effects of a pre-trial response requirement on impulsive choice
responding with pigeons and rats (Mazur, 2012). Subjects were required to engage in
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differing amounts of responding (lever press or key peck) before choice presentation of
SSR versus LLR. For example, either one response or forty responses may be required
before each choice trial. Results indicated that rats consistently chose the LLR when
more responding was required to reach the choice point; however, no consistent effects of
the pre-trial ratio were found for pigeons.
In summary, the data resulted in interesting implications. It was suggested by the
author that either rats may be more sensitive to long-term reinforcement rates than
pigeons, or that rats do not discount delayed rewards as heavily as pigeons. An alternate
explanation is also possible. A higher pre-trial response requirement results in a further
delayed choice presentation. As discussed previously with commitment procedures, the
more time that is between the commitment point and choice point, the more likely an
organism is to choose the LLR. It is possible that pre-trial response requirements follow
the same principles. An FR 40 pre-trial response requirement increases the amount of
time preceding the choice option compared to an FR 1 response requirement. Similar
effects on choice responding observed in studies related to commitment (Rachlin &
Green, 1972) may be demonstrated by pre-trial response requirements. The literature
investigating pre-trial response requirements is limited to basic research and has not yet
been applied to human choice studies.
Additional considerations for altering choice responding. Researchers have
noted that choice responding demonstrated by nonhumans such as pigeons tend to be
impulsive compared to a more shallow degree of choice responding often demonstrated
by humans. One explanation for this is that studies with nonhumans typically investigate
choice responding using primary reinforcers such as access to grain (Mazur & Logue,
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1978). Studies with humans that demonstrate self-control choice responding often use
conditioned reinforces such as money (Scheres et al., 2006). Two out of 22 studies
included in this review investigated the effects of delay to token delivery and exchange
periods on choice responding with pigeons (Jackson & Hackenberg, 1996) and adult
humans (Hyten et al., 1994).
Jackson and Hackenberg (1996) investigated self-control procedures that involved
light illumination (LED) as a form of conditioned reinforcement. Pigeon subjects could
choose between one LED available immediately or three LEDs after a delay. Each LED
was exchangeable for 2 s access to grain during exchange periods. When delays to
exchange periods were based on choice allocation (exchange was available sooner if SSR
was chosen compared to a further delayed exchange period associated with LLR),
subjects generally chose SSR over LLR. However, when delays to exchange periods were
held constant despite choice allocation, subjects generally chose LLR. Results of the
study demonstrated that subjects preferred the option that resulted in a greater amount of
food more often if the choices also produced LEDs (conditioned reinforcers). Results
also indicated that delay to the exchange period had more influence on choice responding
than delay to tokens.
Hyten et al. (1994) investigated the effects of both delay to points (conditioned
reinforcer) and exchange periods on choice responding in adult humans. Two types of
conditions were employed including point delay and exchange delay conditions. Subjects
were presented with choice options between SSR (smaller amount of points) available
immediately versus LLR (larger amount of points) available after delays (15, 30, or 60 s).
In the point delay condition, points were exchanged for money immediately following
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sessions. Subjects demonstrated self-control responding during this condition. In the
exchange delay condition, subjects were presented with choice options between SSR
(smaller amount of points) available immediately and exchangeable immediately after the
session versus LLR (larger amount of points) exchangeable for money after delays
(1 day, 3 weeks, or 6 weeks). In this condition, self-control choice responding was
observed at a exchange delay of one day but reversed to impulsive choice responding
when the delay to the exchange period was three or six weeks.
In summary, positive outcomes have been shown for the use of conditioned
reinforcers to increase self-control choice responding, but more importantly that
exchange delays have a more significant influence on choice responding for the LLR.
This may be important to the development of interventions related to impulsive choice
responding. Conditioned reinforcers such as tokens are often used in the natural
environment as rewards. There is typically a delay associated with receiving tokens as
well as to the exchange period. If the subjective value of a larger amount of tokens is not
weakened as a function of delay to receive the tokens, rather the subjective value of
primary reinforcers associated with those tokens are weakened as a function of delay to
the exchange period, then it is possible that more frequent exchange periods are necessary
to treatment effectiveness.
General Conclusions
Several themes emerged as a result of the current review. First, there is an
apparent need for further research. As a whole, the current body of literature
investigating procedures to teach delay-to-reinforcement tolerance is limited. The wide
range of ages and populations investigated increases generality of these procedures, yet
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limits the empirical basis for the use of these treatments with a specific age or population
group. For example, although progressive delay procedures are supported by the
literature, there is no empirical support for its use with adolescents. It is also necessary to
investigate novel procedures to address impulsive choice responding. A variety of
treatment options may be necessary to maximize effectiveness at the individual level.
For example, it is possible that a concurrent activity may not be effective in altering
choice responding and teaching delay-to-reinforcement in some individuals. As a result,
additional empirically based treatment options should be available.
Second, a majority of the studies included in this review investigated combined
treatment procedures. The effectiveness of several procedures as independent treatments
is unknown. This is important when designing treatments that are both effective and
efficient. For example, if concurrent activities are effective independent of progressive
delay procedures, increases in self-control choice responding may occur faster with
implementation of concurrent activities alone compared to a treatment package. Third,
the methods associated with each procedure vary significantly resulting in unclear
parameters necessary for treatment effectiveness. This is important when implementing
procedures to teach self-control choice responding as it is not clear which parameters are
essential to the procedure’s effectiveness. For example, several studies investigating
progressive delay procedures gradually increase delay by varying time increments. It is
unclear how a researcher or practitioner should decide which parameters to follow. For
example, one study reports progressive delay methods involving incremental delay
increases of 5 s while another study reports increases of 10 s. Replication of current
procedures is necessary.
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Third, an important theme that emerged from analysis of the current body of
literature is that although some treatment procedures currently available to address
impulsive choice responding manipulate the length of the delay to the larger reward, none
of the current procedures manipulate the amount of the reward. As the change in reward
value in temporal discounting is due to the length of the delay to that reward,
manipulating time is a logical course of action. However, there are a variety of
dimensions that affect choice, and changes in either immediacy (length of delay) or
magnitude (amount of reward) can have significant effects on behavior (Neef & Lutz,
2001). It may, therefore, be advantageous to investigate manipulating reward amount,
rather than just reward delay, to determine whether manipulating amount could serve as
an effective intervention to alter impulsive responding.
As of yet, the effects of manipulating reward amount on impulsive choice
responding has not been evaluated. Progressive delay is the primary procedure that
manipulates delay to the reward. In progressive delay procedures, the magnitude of the
SSR and LLR remains constant, but the delay to the LLR is systematically increased with
each LLR choice. In addition, delay to token delivery and exchange periods has been
investigated. The remaining procedures do not systematically alter delay, but rather
focus on manipulating behaviors that occur either before the choice or during the delay.
Concurrent activity procedures, for example, require engagement in certain activities
during the delay. Visual aids such as countdown timers provide a visual representation of
the passage of time. Rule delivery and commitment procedures focus on altering
behavior prior to the presentation of the choice options. Rule delivery, for example,
describes an optimal choice that should be made (i.e., they identify the LLR as the better
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choice option). Commitment procedures require a binding choice allocation to either
reward prior to the choice trial. Last, although reward linking and bundling procedures
do somewhat alter the amount of rewards, the amounts in these procedures remain static
and do not change throughout the procedure. Thus, no current procedures systematically
alter amount of reward across trials to influence choice of the LLR.
Manipulation of the amount of the larger reward while holding the delay constant
may be an effective method of promoting self-control with temporally delayed choice
options. One method of manipulating the amount of reward might be to split the larger
reward into both immediate and delayed portions. Thus, the choice options would be
between a small reward now (SSR) and a small reward now plus a larger reward later
(SSR + LLR). After selection of the SSR + LLR, small amounts of the immediate reward
could be shifted to the delayed portion while the delay remained the same. This could
continue until the final choice options were between a SSR and a LLR. If, for example,
an option was presented between $300 now (SSR) versus $1,000 in one year (LLR), an
impulsive choice for the SSR is likely. If the amount of reward was manipulated, the
choice might be between $300 now (SSR) versus $300 now plus $700 in one year (SSR +
LLR). Thus, the total amount of the reward remains the same ($1,000) but the amount is
split across the delay. Upon choice of the SSR + LLR, the reward can be shifted to $200
now plus $800 after a delay, followed by $100 now plus $900 after a delay, and $1,000
after a delay. Shifting the amount of the larger reward may establish a pattern of choice
responding for the larger reward after the delay, thereby promoting self-control as it
pertains to temporal discounting.

!

46!

One benefit of this approach is that this type of procedure could be implemented
either as a stand-alone treatment or be combined with other procedures focusing on
impulsive choice responding. For example, the effects of a progressive delay procedure
may be enhanced by not only manipulating the delay (as is currently done) but also
shifting portions of the LLR across the delay. Essentially, this treatment package may be
even more effective at altering impulsive choice responding by addressing both of the
primary dimensions related to discounting larger rewards (immediacy and magnitude of
reward). Manipulation of the amount of the larger reward to shift choice responding as
described above provides another avenue for researchers to approach the study of
temporal discounting.
The current study sought to add to the current body of literature by investigating a
novel procedure to teach self-control responding in young children. If children can be
taught to forgo smaller immediate rewards and make choices for larger delayed rewards,
then it may be less likely that maladaptive behaviors will develop. Thus, choices may be
made for larger more favorable outcomes in daily life. In the current study, a novel
procedure that closely manipulated the amount of rewards associated with a delay was
investigated with young children. This novel method, called a shifting delay procedure,
involved splitting the larger delayed reward into both an immediate and delayed reward,
and then gradually shifted the immediate portion to the delayed portion. The effects of a
shifting delay procedure on choice responding will be reported and implications will be
discussed.
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Chapter 3
Method
Participants and Setting
The study took place at a small preschool in a large metropolitan city in the midsouth. The school was a three-day weekly, play-oriented preschool program that
provided educational services to typically developing children ages 4 months to 5 years
old. Children in the 4- and 5-year-old classes were invited to participate by a recruitment
letter (see Appendix A). The first six children to return the consent forms were recruited
to participate in the study. Two of the children in the study were identified by their
teachers as impulsive, and each child’s parents/guardians consented to his or her
participation (see Appendix B). All of the children were Caucasian, and none of the
participants were diagnosed with a disability specifically related to impulsivity at the time
of the study. Three males and three females participated. Sally, Jake, and Melissa were 5
years old; and Fred, Bobby, and Jessica were 4 years old at the time of the study.
All sessions were conducted in a classroom that was not being used for the current
school year. The classroom contained typical classroom materials such as shelving with
blocks, tables, and chairs. Sessions were conducted three times per week during morning
hours and lasted approximately 15 min per assessment session and 5 min per choice
session.
Measurement
The dependent measure in this study was choice response. This was defined as
the participant indicating preference for either the smaller sooner reward or larger later
reward by vocal or gesturing (i.e., pointing) to the preferred option. Event recording data
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was collected across choice trials. Each choice option selected was recorded for each
trial. The primary independent variable in this study was a shifting delay procedure and
was implemented across any of the participants for whom a stable pattern of baseline
choice responding for SSR was obtained. Shifting delay procedures are described below
and entailed manipulating the amount of the larger delayed reward by splitting it into
both an immediate and delayed portion, and then systematically shifting the immediate
portion to the delayed portion. This procedure will be described in more detail below.
Interobserver Agreement and Procedural Fidelity
Two independent observers collected data for at least 50% of trials across
participants through video recordings to assess interobserver agreement (IOA) and
procedural fidelity. The independent observers were doctoral level graduate students.
Target behavior definitions and treatment procedures were explained by the
experimenter. In addition, data sheets and checklists with steps associated with each
condition were provided to each independent observer. The independent observers were
afforded the opportunity to ask any questions related to the procedures or data collection.
For interobserver agreement, the independent observers recorded choice responding using
identical measurement procedures. Exact count-per-session IOA was calculated by
comparing both measures and determining whether the measures for each trial agreed.
The total number of agreements was then divided by the number of agreements plus
disagreements and multiplied by 100. Interobserver agreement was calculated across at
least 50% of trials for all participants and measured at 100% across participants.
In addition to interobserver agreement, procedural fidelity was assessed. A
checklist was made listing the procedures for each condition including non-computerized
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temporal discounting assessment; computerized temporal discounting assessment;
baselines 1, 2, and 3; the shifting delay procedure; and the progressive delay procedure
(explained below). The specific steps of each condition were listed, and a second
observer recorded whether or not the step was implemented across at least 50% of trials
for all participants. Levels of procedural fidelity were at 100% across participants.
Data for all tasks were recorded via paper and pencil by the experimenter with
exception of the Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm (TCIP). The computer program
collected data for the TCIP assessment.
Procedures and Experimental Design
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of a shifting delay procedure
to teach self-control. The effects of a shifting delay procedure were examined in a
multiple baseline across participants design. Participants were presented with
concurrently available response options that resulted in either smaller immediate rewards
or larger delayed rewards depending on the choice made. Prior to investigating the
effects of the shifting delay procedure on choice responding, a preference assessment and
temporal discounting assessments were conducted in order to identify (a) preferred
rewards, (b) individualized degrees of discounting, and (c) an appropriate delay goal for
each participant.
Pre-assessment procedures. The pre-assessment consisted of four possible tasks
including (a) a Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment, (b) a noncomputerized version of the temporal discounting assessment similar to that conducted
by Scheres et al. (2006), (c) a computer-based, manually controlled version of the
temporal discounting assessment similar to that conducted by Scheres et al. (2006),
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(d) the Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm purchased from the Neurobehavioral Research
Laboratory and Clinic in San Antonio, TX, and/or (e) a natural baseline similar to that
conducted by Dixon and Cummings (2001). The purpose of the pre-assessment was to
identify a preferred reward, the indifference point at which the smaller sooner reward
(SSR) was equal in value to the larger later reward (LLR), and an individualized delay
goal for each participant.
The pre-assessment portion of the study included a Multiple Stimulus Without
Replacement preference assessment (MSWO) and three variations of temporal
discounting assessments. A MSWO preference assessment was conducted according to
procedures outlined by DeLeon and Iwata (1996) to identify preferred rewards for each
participant. Different temporal discounting procedures were used across participants
because of inconsistent data patterns. A degree of discounting was not indicated and an
alternate form of temporal discounting assessment was used.
Preference assessment. Five items were identified by the participants’ teachers
as possible reinforcers including marshmallows, pretzels, Goldfish, Skittles, and M&Ms.
The participant was seated in a chair at a table across from the experimenter. The student
was allowed to sample each item prior to the assessment. The items were then sequenced
randomly in a straight line on the table. The experimenter instructed the participant,
“Pick one.” After the item was selected, the choice was recorded on the data sheet and
was not replaced for the remainder of the assessment. Before the next presentation the
remaining items were rotated by taking the item on the left end and moving it to the right
end, and then the other items were shifted to the left. The procedure was repeated until
all of the items were selected. Each item was given a ratio based on the number of times
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that it was selected over the number of times that it was available. These procedures
were repeated three times across three sessions. The total number of times that each item
was selected was divided by the number of times that each item was available to yield a
score that indicated the percentage of trials during which the item was chosen. Finally,
the percentage score calculated for each item was used to rank the items from highest to
lowest to identify the item that would potentially be the most effective reinforcer.
Non-computerized temporal discounting assessment. The initial temporal
discounting assessment was a 120 trial presentation of hypothetical reward choices for
both a preferred reward identified by the MSWO as well as pennies. The assessment
consisted of a constant larger later reward with manipulation of the smaller sooner reward
in ascending and descending sequences as described by Critchfield and Kollins (2001).
Critchfield & Kollins explain that the current value for the larger later reward is estimated
by averaging the switch points (indifference points) in the ascending and descending
choice sequences. This assessment was modeled after the assessment described by
Scheres et al. (2006).
The assessment in the current study was a non-computerized, visual
representation of the Scheres et al. (2006) assessment and presented choices of
hypothetical rewards that the participants did not receive. A poster board was separated
into sections with a picture of a visual timer (TimerTouch© iPad application)
representing the delay to the larger later reward. The space between the smaller sooner
reward and the larger later reward increased as the delay increased in order to provide a
visual delay. With the introduction of each new delay contingency, the experimenter
said, “This is (X) seconds” and started the timer so the participant would experience each
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delay length before making choices between an immediate or delayed reward. The
participants did not receive the rewards, as the assessment was entirely hypothetical.
Each choice option was presented simultaneously with the smaller sooner reward on the
left and the larger later reward on the right (see Figure 1).
The participants were not told the duration of delays but instead experienced them
(Scheres et al., 2006). Participants sat across from the experimenter. The experimenter
provided directions that emphasized that there were no correct or incorrect answers by
saying, “You are going to choose between a reward that you would be given right away
or a bigger reward that you would have to wait to be given. Let’s practice. If the reward
is on this line (point to line 1), then you would get the reward right away. If the reward is
on this line (point to larger later reward line), then you would get the reward in (X delay;
e.g., 10) seconds (start visual timer to experience delay). There are no right or wrong
answers. You pick the one that you would want if the reward was real. You can point to
the one that you choose.”
The experimenter then presented each choice trial by saying, “Would you rather
have (X rewards; e.g., marshmallows) now or (Y rewards; e.g., marshmallows) after you
wait?” The participant vocally indicated and/or gestured to the choice preference, and the
experimenter manually recorded choice responses. At each new delay contingency, the
experimenter said, “This is (X) seconds,” and began the timer for the participant to
experience the delay before making choices. In addition, the space between the
immediate reward and the later reward was larger as the delay increased providing a
visual delay. The participant did not experience rewards in this condition of the study.
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Computerized temporal discounting assessment. A computerized version of the
temporal discounting assessment previously described was employed in order to conduct
the assessment in a more efficient manner. The participant was only required to point or
vocally indicate preference of reward so computer skills were unnecessary. The
computerized version of the delay discounting assessment was identical to the noncomputerized version with the exception of it being conducted in digital format. The
computer-based assessment did not record data or advance automatically. The
experimenter manually conducted the assessment and recorded each response choice. As
with the non-computerized version, 120 choice trials representing hypothetical rewards
were presented. The same procedures were followed in this assessment as in the noncomputerized assessment.
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Two choice impulsivity paradigm. The Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm
(TCIP) is a computerized software program that requires participants to engage in a series
of trials that indicate an individual’s level of impulsivity. The TCIP has been
investigated across adolescents (Dougherty et al., 2003) and adults (Moeller et al., 2002).
The TCIP is a temporal discounting task in which participants choose between larger
rewards associated with longer delays and smaller rewards associated with shorter delays.
In this task, participants experienced the delay as well as rewards in the form of receiving
points on a counter. Participants engaged in discrete trials in which they selected a
square or a circle. The shapes appeared on the computer screen and the choice of the
shape resulted in the respective consequence. An adjusting delay procedure was used to
find each participant’s indifference point at which he/she discounts delayed rewards and
chooses smaller, more immediate rewards. The indifference point was identified as the
switch point when the objective value of the smaller sooner reward was equal in
subjective value to the larger later reward.
The TCIP program was run on a laptop with a track pad. The participant sat next
to the experimenter and was read the standardized directions for the TCIP program with
three exceptions to accommodate for the age of the participants: (a) the six practice trials
were conducted immediately after explanation of the practice trials and then the
remainder of the directions were read to the participant instead of all of the directions
being read first and the participant engaging in practice trials and choice trials
consecutively; (b) the participants were explicitly told the contingencies that 3 points
were associated with choosing the circle and 15 points were associated with choosing the
square; and (c) the task was referred to as a “game” instead of “task.”
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The assessment included six practice trials and 30 choice trials. During the
practice trials, the experimenter observed whether the participant was able to use the
track pad on the laptop with ease. The experimenter provided prompts as needed such as
“We cannot talk during the game” or “Keep looking at the screen” throughout the
assessment. The participants were expected to select one of two shapes when they
appeared on the computer screen. A circle and a square appeared that were associated
with respective contingencies. The experimenter set parameters for the delay and reward
contingencies. The circle was associated with the smaller immediate (1 s delay) reward
of 5 points, and the square was associated with the larger later reward of 15 points
(adjusting delay). A variable procedure was used in which the delay changed based on
the participant’s responding. The adjusting procedure allowed for the identification of an
indifference point that indicates the point at which the two rewards are equally preferred.
In the current study, if the participant chose the smaller sooner reward, the circle, then the
larger later reward delay length was decreased by 5 s. If the participant chose the larger
later reward (i.e., the square) then the larger reward delay was increased by 5 s. When
the participant chose a shape, the corresponding reward was delivered after the delay
requirement had been met. The reward was delivered in the form of points that added to
a cumulative points counter on the screen. If the participant chose the circle, 5 points
were delivered immediately. If the participant chose the square, 15 points were delivered
after the delay requirement was met.
Natural baseline. The natural baseline was conducted using the most preferred
reward identified by the MSWO. The participant was seated at the table next to the
experimenter. The larger reward (e.g., 10 marshmallows) was placed on the table in view
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of the participant. The experimenter said, “You may eat this whenever you want, but
wait as long as you can. I’ll be over here.” The experimenter then walked a few feet
away with her back to the participant. The trial was ended when the participant
consumed the reward. Latency from the time that the experimenter walked away to the
time that the participant put the first reward in his/her mouth was recorded.
Experimental conditions. Experimental conditions consisted of four possible
conditions; (a) baseline 1 with a concurrent activity, (b) baseline 2 with a concurrent
activity and a multiplied delay goal, (c) baseline 3 without a concurrent activity and with
a multiplied delay goal, (d) shifting delay procedure, and (e) progressive delay procedure.
During each condition both forced choice and free choice trials were conducted.
All experimental tasks were conducted using pictorial representation of the
preferred reward, the delay (TimerTouch©), and the amount of the reward associated
with each option (see Figure 2). Participants vocally identified or pointed to their
preferred choice. With the introduction of each new condition, one forced trial was
conducted to expose the participants to the delay and contingencies associated with each
choice option. Both forced choice and free choice trials began with the display of two
choice options (see Figure 2). The preferred reward was displayed above each choice
option. Each choice option had a picture visually representing the delay with the number
of preferred rewards associated with each delay. For example, the smaller sooner reward
was represented graphically by a visual clock at 0:00 min with the number 3 underneath
to represent “3 (rewards; e.g., marshmallows) now.” The larger later reward was
graphically represented by a clock with the calculated delay goal (e.g., 12 s) and the
number of rewards that would be delivered after the delay underneath to represent “10
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(rewards; e.g., marshmallows) after you wait (X delay).”

Forced choice trials. A forced choice trial was conducted for each choice option
one time prior to conducting free choice trials involving those contingencies. During
forced choice trials, the experimenter pointed to one of the choice options and told the
child, “You are going to receive this reward.” The participant experienced the
contingency associated with the respective choice including a smaller reward delivered
immediately or a larger reward delivered after a delay. For example, the delay to the
larger reward for baseline 1 was initially set as the indifference point alone, then the
participants were exposed to baseline 2 with the new delay calculated as the indifference
point multiplied by 12. Before conducting free choice trials with the new contingency in
baseline 2, a forced trial was conducted so participants would experience the
contingencies associated with the new larger later reward choice. Participants were not
able to save the edible rewards. Rewards were consumed before the participant went
back to the classroom.
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Free choice trials. During free choice trials, the experimenter asked, “Do you
want (X rewards) right now or (Y rewards) after you wait (X delay)?” When the
preferred choice was identified through vocal or gestural indication, the participant
experienced the contingency associated with the respective choice. Free choice trials
were conducted only after a forced choice trial was conducted to introduce new
contingencies.
Baseline 1 with concurrent activity. The indifference point for each participant
was identified as the mean delay during the TCIP task and was used as the delay to the
larger later reward. The participant was seated at the table next to the experimenter with
the smaller sooner and larger later reward choices presented as described above. The
experimenter asked, “Do you want 3 (rewards; e.g., marshmallows) now or 10 (rewards;
e.g., marshmallows) after you wait (X delay)?” Acceptable responses included pointing
or vocally indicating choice. Coloring was the concurrent activity presented across
participants because it was identified as a neutral activity. Participants often engaged in
coloring in the classroom so it was not a novel activity yet was not identified as an
aversive activity.
The same activity was experienced by the participant regardless of whether he/she
chose the SSR or LLR. If the participant chose the SSR, the reward was delivered
immediately and the participant was then allowed to color for a period of time equal to
the delay length associated with the larger later reward contingency. After the time
elapsed, the activity materials were removed and the trial was ended. If the participant
chose the LLR, then the experimenter said, “Since you picked that one, you will need to
wait (X delay) before I can give it to you. You may color while we wait.” The
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concurrent activity was provided, and the timer was started. The reward was delivered
after the delay elapsed, the activity materials were removed, and the trial was ended.
Attention provided by the experimenter was minimal during the delay.
Baseline 2 with concurrent activity and multiplied delay. The condition differed
from baseline 1 in that the indifference point was multiplied by 12 to identify a delay goal
similar to procedures explained by Dixon & Cummings (2001). All other procedures
were identical to those described above. The delay to the LLR was initially identified by
the TCIP for participants 1, 2, and 3. Baseline 1 data did not demonstrate that the larger
later reward was discounted as a function of the identified delay (12 s) for two of the
three participants. Baseline 2 consisted of the initial delay multiplied by 12 to identify a
delay at which the LLR might be discounted.
Baseline 3 without concurrent activity, with multiplied delay goal. Baseline 3
was identical to baseline 2 with the exception of the removal of the concurrent activity.
The participant was not provided with an activity to engage in during the delay. The
participant was seated at the table next to the experimenter with the smaller sooner and
larger later reward choices presented as described above. The experimenter asked, “Do
you want 3 (rewards; e.g., marshmallows) now or 10 (rewards; e.g., marshmallows) after
you wait (X delay).” Acceptable responses included pointing or vocally indicating
choice. If the participant chose the SSR, the reinforcer was delivered immediately and
the trial was ended. If the participant chose the LLR, the experimenter said, “Since you
picked that one, you will need to wait before I can give it to you.” The timer was started,
the reinforcer was delivered after the delay elapsed without a concurrent activity, and the
trial was ended. During the delay, participants were expected to remain seated at the
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table without formally engaging in any activity. It was noted that participants often
counted, sang, or talked during the delay. The experimenter did not intervene if the
participant engaged in personal concurrent activities such as those mentioned. However,
if the participant attempted to leave the seat or engage with the experimenter, then
prompts were provided including “Please stay in your seat” and “ Please wait.”
Shifting delay procedure. The shifting delay procedure began with an option of a
smaller reward immediately (SSR) or a smaller reward immediately plus a larger reward
(SSR + LLR) after a delay. When the participant chose the smaller reward immediately
plus the larger reward after a delay for two consecutive trials, then the reward was shifted
to decrease the amount given immediately and increase the amount delivered after the
delay. Ultimately, the participant would be offered a smaller reward immediately or a
larger reward after a delay with a history of choosing the larger reward with a delay. For
example, the participant might be offered 3 rewards immediately or 3 rewards
immediately plus 7 more after the delay (see Figure 3). Once two consecutive choices
were made for the LLR, then the immediate reward was faded to the delayed reward and
the participant was offered 3 rewards immediately or 2 rewards immediately plus 8 more
after the delay. The shifting reinforcement for the LLR continued to 1 immediately plus
9 later, then to 10 later. The last phase of the teaching procedure was identical to
baseline as the participant was offered 3 rewards immediately or 10 after the delay.
Vocal or gestural indication of the preferred choice resulted in the presentation of the
preferred reward immediately or after fulfilling the delay requirement.
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Progressive delay procedure. For Jake, a progressive delay procedure was
implemented to shift choice allocation from the SSR to the LLR as the shifting delay
procedure proved ineffective. This progressive delay procedure was not conducted with
other participants either due to time constraints or because the shifting delay procedure
proved effective and no further procedures were necessary. The progressive delay
schedule of reinforcement followed procedures presented by Dixon et al. (1998), Dixon
and Holcomb (2000), and Dixon and Cummings (2001). Progressive delay procedures
typically involve presentation of both the large and small rewards immediately with
delivery of the larger reward being gradually delayed over time (Schweitzer & SulzerAzaroff, 1988). For example, progressive delay procedures begin delay values for both
choice options at 0 s and the delay associated with the larger reward increases by
increments (e.g., 5 s each time a predetermined criterion is reached) (Binder et al., 2000;
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Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988). In the current study, progressive delay procedures
were adapted due to time constraints and implemented with Jake. Instead of beginning
the procedure with both rewards available immediately, the experimenter identified the
delay at which Jake chose the LLR for two consecutive choice trials beginning at a delay
of 15 s. The delay to the LLR was increased by 5 s increments after two consecutive
choices for the LLR were made at each delay. Vocal or gestural indication of the
preferred choice resulted in the presentation of the preferred reward immediately or after
fulfilling the delay requirement.
Pennies. Throughout baseline and experimental conditions, pennies were
presented in choice trials probed across conditions. Penny trials were identical to
baseline 1, 2, and 3 trials. However, the amount of pennies did not change across
treatment conditions and remained constant at 3 immediately versus 10 later. The
purpose of conducting trials with pennies was to investigate the possible generality
effects of experimental conditions to a novel reward. Pennies were provided contingent
upon choice for either reward. However, pennies were not exchangeable for primary
rewards within the study.
Condition Variability Across Participants
There were a variety of variables that influenced which conditions each
participant was exposed to, and these variables will be discussed later for each participant
(see Table 5). As a result of the computerized and non-computerized temporal
discounting assessments not producing a consistent data pattern for Jake, Sally, or
Melissa, the experimenter planned to conduct the TCIP with all participants to identify
the degree of discounting and a delay goal. However, after the TCIP program was
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conducted with Jake, Sally, and Melissa, the program reported an error and shut down
during multiple attempts to complete the temporal discounting task with Fred. As a
result, a natural baseline condition similar to Dixon and Cummings (2001) was
implemented to identify the average latency wait time and a delay goal for Fred, Jessica,
and Bobby. Based on the pre-assessment data, choice preference was assessed across
baseline and treatment conditions for each participant. Baselines were staggered across
participants in a multiple baseline fashion.

Jake. Jake was exposed to the initial pre-assessment tasks including the noncomputerized and computer-based versions of the temporal discounting task modeled
after Scheres et al. (2006) and the TCIP task as an attempt to identify an indifference
point for choosing delayed rewards. Based on the TCIP task, Jake’s indifference point
was identified as 12 s by the mean delay during the adjusting delay procedure. He then
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participated in experimental conditions including baseline 1, baseline 2, baseline 3 and
shifting delay. He also participated in a progressive delay procedure similar to
Schweitzer and Sulzer-Azaroff (1988), Dixon and Cummings (2001), Binder et al.
(2000), and Dixon et al. (2003).
Sally. Sally was exposed to the initial pre-assessment tasks identical to Jake, as
well as baseline 1 and 2 conditions. Sally’s indifference point was also identified as 12 s
based on the mean delay of the TCIP task. However, Sally was discontinued as a
participant after she reported that her parent told her to pick the LLR, and the data
supported an abrupt switch in choice preference.
Melissa. Melissa was exposed to the initial pre-assessment tasks identical to
Jake, as well as baseline 1, 2, and 3 conditions. Melissa’s indifference point was
identified as 12 s based on the mean delay of the TCIP task. A baseline of consistent
SSR choice was not obtained for Melissa, as she was not discounting the delayed reward.
As a result, Melissa was never exposed to the shifting delay condition.
Fred. Fred participated in natural baseline and baseline 3. According to natural
baseline results for Fred, the mean waiting time was calculated to be 10.75 s. His delay
goal was calculated by multiplying his mean waiting time from natural baseline by 12
according to procedures presented by Dixon and Cummings (2001). The delay goal was
calculated to be 129 s. After obtaining a steady state of choice responding for SSR in
baseline 3, Fred was exposed to the shifting delay procedure.
Jessica. Jessica participated in conditions identical to Fred. Her mean waiting
time in natural baseline was 3.25 s. Her delay goal was calculated in the same manner as
described above to be 39 s.
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Bobby. Bobby participated in conditions identical to Fred and Jessica, and the
same procedure was used to calculate his delay goal of 141 s based on his mean waiting
time of 11.75 s in natural baseline.
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Chapter 4
Results
Jake
Pre-assessment. Jake was exposed to pre-assessment tasks including
(a) Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment, (b) non-computerized
temporal discounting assessment, (c) computerized temporal discounting assessment, and
(d) Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm.
Multiple stimulus without replacement preference assessment. Jake’s preferred
reward was miniature marshmallows. The percentage score for marshmallows was 0.5
indicating that it was chosen on 50% of the trials in which it was available. This was
predicted to be the most effective reinforcer of those presented. This assessment was not
repeated once further pre-assessment tasks and experimental conditions began.
Temporal discounting assessments. For Jake, neither the non-computerized nor
the computerized temporal discounting assessments yielded a clear demonstration of
discounting delayed rewards. The TCIP task identified Jake’s indifference point as 12 s
based on the mean delay of the adjusting delay choice procedure.
Experimental conditions. Jake was exposed to experimental conditions
(a) baseline 1, (b) baseline 2, (c) baseline 3, (d) shifting delay procedure, and
(e) progressive delay procedure.
Baseline. Figure 4 demonstrates Jake’s choice responding in baselines 1, 2, and
3. Jake chose SSR for 75% of trials and LLR for 25% of four total baseline 1 trials.
There was a stable choice responding pattern for SSR. In baseline 2, Jake chose SSR for
50% of trials and LLR for 50% of trials. In baseline 3, Jake chose SSR for 83.33% of
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trials and LLR for 16.67% of trials. In this final baseline there was a relatively stable
choice for SSR.!
Shifting delay procedure. When the shifting delay procedure was implemented,
the initial choice option (3 now vs. 3 now + 7 later) resulted in stable choice responding
for SSR. Jake chose SSR for 75% of trials and LLR for 25% of four total choice trials.
As a result of consistent SSR choices, the contingencies were altered (3 now vs. 5 now +
5 later) so that the reward available immediately in the LLR choice option was more than
the SSR option. However, the new choice option did not result in a shift of choice
response to LLR. Jake continued to choose SSR for 100% of two choice trials. The
experimenter returned to the initial contingency of the shifting delay procedure (3 now
vs. 3 now + 7 later) and Jake chose SSR for this one trial. In an attempt to isolate a
potentially competitive variable of activities in the classroom, the experimenter offered
Jake the initial shifting delay contingency choice option (3 now vs. 3 now + 7 later) with
the added contingency of Jake returning to the classroom during the delay and the
experimenter delivering the reward at the classroom door when the delay elapsed. Jake
continued to make a choice for SSR at 100% for two choice trials. At this point, the
experimenter offered a choice trial of “3 marshmallows now vs. 10 marshmallows now”
in order to assess present motivation for the reward. One choice trial with both reward
amounts available immediately was conducted. Jake chose 10 marshmallows now, which
was interpreted as a present motivation for the larger reward.
Progressive delay procedure. The shifting delay procedure did not result in a
shift of choice response to LLR for Jake. As a result, the experimenter implemented an
empirically based procedure, progressive delay, that has been demonstrated to be
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successful in increasing LLR choice responding (Binder et al., 2000; Dixon &
Cummings, 2001; Dixon et al., 2003; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988). The delay was
significantly reduced to 15 s as a starting point. At a delay of 15 s, Jake chose SSR
across two trials. As a result, the delay was reduced to 5 s. At a 5 s delay, Jake chose
LLR for two consecutive trials. From this point forward, the delay was increased by 5 s
when LLR was chosen for two trials consecutively. After two consecutive choices were
made for LLR at a 5 s delay, the delay was increased to 10 s. Four trials were conducted
with this delay value. Jake chose LLR for the first trial but switched to SSR on the
second trial. As a result, more trials were conducted for which Jake chose LLR for two
consecutive trials. The delay was increased to 15 s and Jake continued to choose LLR for
two consecutive trials. The delay was increased to 20 s and Jake chose SSR for two
consecutive trials. The experimenter would have conducted further trials to examine
overall trend at this delay value; however, time was limited as the school year ended.
Pennies. Probe trials were conducted to assess possible generalized effects in
choice responding across rewards. There was no clear difference in responding across
conditions for Jake. He made a choice for LLR during 57% of seven trials across
baselines 1 and 2, 50% of two trials in baseline 3, and 28.57% of seven trials across
shifting and progressive delay procedures.
Bobby
Pre-assessment. Bobby was exposed to pre-assessment tasks including
(a) Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment and (b) natural
baseline.
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Multiple stimulus without replacement preference assessment. Bobby’s
preferred reward was marshmallows. The percentage score for marshmallows was 0.75
indicating that it was chosen on 75% of the trials in which it was available. This was
predicted to be the most effective reinforcer of those presented. This assessment was not
repeated once further pre-assessment tasks and experimental conditions began.
Natural baseline. Bobby was exposed to four natural baseline trials. Latency
was measured at 11, 16, 10, and 10 s respectively. The mean waiting time to the larger
reward was 14.5 s for Bobby. His baseline delay was calculated to be 141 s.
Experimental conditions. Bobby was exposed to experimental conditions
(a) baseline 3 and (b) shifting delay procedure.
Baseline. Figure 4 demonstrates Bobby’s choice responses in baseline 3. Bobby
chose SSR for 100% of trials during five total baseline 3 trials. There was a stable choice
responding pattern for SSR.
Shifting delay procedure. When the shifting delay procedure was implemented,
the initial larger delayed choice option (3 now vs. 3 now + 7 later) resulted in consistent
choice responding for LLR. With two consecutive choices for LLR at each shifted
contingency (3 now vs. 2 now + 8 later; 3 now vs. 1 now + 9 later), Bobby continued to
make a consistent choice for LLR. However, an abrupt change in choice responding
pattern occurred when exposed to the final shifting delay choice option (3 now vs. 10
later). When presented with 3 marshmallows now vs. 10 marshmallows later, Bobby
chose SSR for 100% of three total trials. A reversal to the previous shifting delay
contingency (3 now vs. 1 now + 9 later) was employed; however, Bobby continued to
make a choice response for SSR. Bobby reported that he needed to choose the smaller
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reward because his mother did not like him to have a lot of marshmallows in a day. It is
unclear if this had an effect on Bobby’s choice response or if motivation for the larger
reward was low. One trial was presented with both rewards available immediately, and
Bobby made a choice for SSR.
Pennies. There was no clear difference in responding across conditions for
Bobby. He made a choice for LLR during 25% of eight probe trials across baseline 3 and
shifting delay conditions. He demonstrated a consistent pattern for SSR.
Jessica
Pre-assessment. Jessica was exposed to pre-assessment tasks including
(a) Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment and (b) natural
baseline.
Multiple stimulus without replacement preference assessment. Jessica’s
preferred reward was Goldfish. The percentage score for Goldfish was 0.43 indicating
that it was chosen on 43% of the trials in which it was available. This was predicted to be
the most effective reinforcer of those presented. This assessment was not repeated once
further pre-assessment tasks and experimental conditions began.
Natural baseline. Jessica was exposed to four natural baseline trials. Latency was
measured at 4, 2, 3, and 4 s respectively. The mean waiting time to the larger reward was
3.25 s for Jessica. Her baseline delay was calculated to be 39 s.
Experimental conditions. Jessica was exposed to experimental conditions
(a) baseline 3 and (b) shifting delay procedure.
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Baseline. Figure 4 demonstrates Jessica’s choice responses in baseline 3. Jessica
chose SSR for 75% of trials and LLR for 25% of eight total baseline 3 trials. There was a
relatively stable choice responding pattern for SSR.
Shifting delay procedure. When the shifting delay procedure was implemented,
the initial larger delayed choice option (3 now vs. 3 now + 7 later) resulted in consistent
choice responding for SSR. Jessica chose the smaller immediate reward for 75% of four
total shifting delay trials with the initial choice contingencies. Jessica made a comment
to the experimenter that she no longer wanted the reward. At this point, the experimenter
offered two choice trials of “3 Goldfish now vs. 10 Goldfish now” in order to assess
present motivation for the reward. Jessica chose 3 Goldfish now, which was interpreted
as low motivation for the larger reward.
Pennies. There was no clear difference in responding across conditions for
Jessica. She allocated a higher proportion of choices for LLR during baseline 3
compared the shifting delay condition.
Fred
Pre-assessment. Fred was exposed to pre-assessment tasks including
(a) Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment and (b) natural
baseline.
Multiple stimulus without replacement. Fred’s preferred reward was pretzels.
The percentage score for pretzels was 0.75 indicating that it was chosen on 75% of the
trials in which it was available. This was predicted to be the most effective reinforcer of
those presented. This assessment was not repeated once further pre-assessment tasks and
experimental conditions began.

!

72!

Natural baseline. Fred was exposed to four natural baseline trials. Latency was
measured at 19, 7, 8, and 9 s respectively. The mean waiting time to the larger reward
was 10.75 s for Fred. His baseline delay was calculated to be 129 s.
Experimental conditions. Fred was exposed to experimental conditions
(a) baseline 3 and (b) shifting delay procedure.
Baseline. Figure 4 demonstrates Fred’s choice responses in baseline 3. Fred
chose SSR for 80% of trials and LLR for 20% of 10 total baseline 3 trials. There was a
relatively stable choice responding pattern for the SSR.
Shifting delay procedure. When the shifting delay procedure was implemented,
the initial larger delayed choice option (3 now vs. 3 now + 7 later) resulted in consistent
choice for LLR. With two consecutive choices for LLR at each shifted contingency
(3 now vs. 2 now + 8 later; 3 now vs. 1 now + 9 later), Fred continued to make a
consistent choice for LLR. A similar pattern continued through the final shifting delay
choice option (3 now vs. 10 later). When presented with 3 pretzels now vs. 10 pretzels
later, Fred chose SSR for 43% and LLR for 57% of seven total trials. Across all shifting
delay choice trials, Fred chose LLR for 77% of total shifting delay trials.
Pennies. There was no clear difference in responding across conditions for Fred.
He made a choice for LLR during 30% of 10 probe trials across baseline 3 and shifting
delay conditions. He demonstrated a stable pattern of responding for the smaller sooner
reward.
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Figure 4. Choice responses for marshmallows and pennies for Jake, marshmallows and pennies for Bobby,
Goldfish and pennies for Jessica, and pretzels and pennies for Fred. The effects of a shifting delay procedure
on choice responding across participants.
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Sally
Pre-assessment. Sally was exposed to pre-assessment tasks including
(a) Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment, (b) non-computerized
temporal discounting assessment, (c) computerized temporal discounting assessment, and
(d) Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm.
Multiple stimulus without replacement preference assessment. Sally’s preferred
reward was identified as pretzels. The percentage score for pretzels was 0.6 indicating
that it was chosen on 60% of the trials in which it was available. This was predicted to be
the most effective reinforcer of those presented. This assessment was not repeated once
further pre-assessment tasks and experimental conditions began.
Temporal discounting assessments. For Sally, neither the non-computerized nor
the computerized temporal discounting assessment yielded a clear demonstration of
discounting delayed rewards. The TCIP task identified Sally’s indifference point as 12 s
based on the mean delay of the adjusting delay choice procedure.
Experimental conditions. Sally was exposed to experimental conditions
(a) baseline 1, (b) baseline 2, and (c) baseline 3.
Baseline. Figure 5 demonstrates Sally’s choice responses in baselines 1, 2, and 3.
Sally chose SSR for 50% of trials and LLR for 50% of four total baseline 1 trials. There
was a variable choice responding pattern in this condition. Sally chose LLR for 100% of
four total baseline 2 trials and two total baseline 3 trials. At the conclusion of the second
baseline 3 trial, Sally reported that her mother instructed her to choose the larger reward.
In consideration of the increased delay requirement and withdrawal of concurrent activity
in baselines 2 and 3, the abrupt change in responding supports the potential influence that
the external variable had on choice. No further trials were conducted with Sally.
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Pennies. Across baseline conditions, Sally demonstrated a clear choice
responding pattern for SSR. She chose SSR for 100% of three total baseline 1 trials and
66% of three total baseline 2 trials. Sally was never exposed to treatment conditions for
pretzels so trials with pennies were discontinued as well.

Figure 5. Choice responses for pretzels and pennies across trials for Sally.!

Melissa
Pre-assessment. Melissa was exposed to pre-assessment tasks including
(a) Multiple Stimulus Without Replacement preference assessment, (b) non-computerized
temporal discounting assessment, (c) computerized temporal discounting assessment, and
(d) Two Choice Impulsivity Paradigm.
Multiple stimulus without replacement preference assessment. Melissa’s
preferred reward was miniature marshmallows. The percentage score for marshmallows
was 0.6 indicating that it was chosen on 60% of the trials in which it was available. This
was predicted to be the most effective reinforcer of those presented. This assessment was
not repeated once further pre-assessment tasks and experimental conditions began.
Temporal discounting assessments. For Melissa, neither the non-computerized
nor the computerized temporal discounting assessment yielded a clear demonstration of
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discounting delayed rewards. The TCIP task identified Melissa’s indifference point as
12 s based on the mean delay of the adjusting delay choice procedure.
Experimental conditions. Melissa was exposed to experimental conditions
(a) baseline 1, (b) baseline 2, and (c) baseline 3.
Baseline. Figure 6 demonstrates Melissa’s choice responses in baselines 1, 2, and
3. Melissa chose SSR for 25% of trials and LLR for 75% of four total baseline 1 trials.
There was a stable choice responding pattern for LLR. Melissa chose SSR for 25% of
trials and LLR for 75% of four total baseline 2 trials. There was a consistent choice
responding pattern for LLR. Melissa continued to choose LLR for 100% of four total
baseline 3 trials. There was a stable choice responding pattern for the LLR across
baseline conditions. Melissa was not exposed to treatment conditions, as she was not
discounting delayed rewards.
Pennies. Probe trials were conducted to assess possible generalization effects in
choice responding across rewards. There was no clear difference in responding across
conditions for Melissa. She made a choice for LLR during 67% of nine probe trials
across baselines 1, 2, and 3. Melissa did not discount the larger delayed reward. Melissa
was not exposed to treatment conditions for marshmallows; as a result probe trials with
pennies were discontinued as well.
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Figure 6. Choice responses for marshmallows and pennies across trials for Melissa.!
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Chapter!5!
!
Discussion!
!
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of a shifting delay procedure
on choice responding between SSR versus LLR in young children. Expansion of the
range of treatments available to teach children to choose larger delayed rewards is
necessary and evident in the current body of literature. Although there are a variety of
treatments that have been investigated to alter impulsive choice responding, few of these
procedures are firmly embedded in the literature. Further, all of the procedures that are
currently available focus on either manipulating the delay associated with the larger
reward, providing rules or requiring pre-commitments to a specific choice, provide visual
representations of the passage of time, bundle rewards, or manipulate the behaviors that
occur during the delay. None of the currently available procedures manipulate the reward
amounts, which leaves the effects of this approach largely unexplored. However, the
value of either reward in a temporal discounting choice arrangement is the result of both
delay to that reward and the amount of reward available. Systematically manipulating the
amount of a larger reward may prove effective as a standalone treatment, or could
possibly be combined with other treatment that manipulates delay length. In this study, a
novel treatment procedure was investigated to teach tolerance of delay-to-reinforcement
to young children by manipulating the amount of the larger delayed reward. This
procedure was termed a shifting delay procedure. Differential effects were observed
across participants. Although the effects of this procedure have not clearly been
established, this may be a treatment option that warrants further inquiry. In addition,
regardless of the specific procedures, it may prove advantageous for researchers to
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continue to investigate procedures that manipulate amount of reward to determine
whether this is an effective approach to promoting self-control.
Implications
The findings of the current study provide several implications significant to delay
discounting measures and teaching delay-to-reinforcement tolerance to young children.
The findings indicate that (a) the utility of using hypothetical rewards and delays for
temporal discounting procedures in young children may be questionable, (b) a shifting
delay procedure may be an effective and possibly more efficient treatment than what is
currently available for teaching self-control responding to young children, and (c) the
initial effects of progressive delay procedures demonstrated by previous literature are
further supported by this study.
Hypothetical versus real discounting tasks. This study raises questions as to
the utility of hypothetical discounting tasks for young children. In the current study, three
participants were exposed to both computerized and non-computerized temporal
discounting assessments. Both assessments were based on hypothetical rewards and
delays. Results did not show consistent choice responding across any of the three
participants exposed to them. Each delay was associated with 24 choice trials with
ascending and descending amounts of SSR pitted against a constant LLR. The
indifference point for each delay option is typically identified as the point at which the
choice for the LLR reverses to the SSR during the ascending choice sequences and vice
versa for the descending sequences. However, choice responding across the three
participants exposed to those conditions did not show this clear response pattern. Instead
of switching from the LLR to the SSR and remaining steady, their responses fluctuated
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between the two options and no indifference points could be determined. Similar data
patterns yielded from hypothetical temporal discounting assessments have been discussed
previously in the literature. Critchfield and Atteberry (2003) reported that discounting
studies with adults!exclude!up!to!15% of their data due to inconsistent patterns such as
multiple reversals in choice allocation. It is possible that the exclusion of inconsistent
data patterns is much higher in discounting studies with children. Reed and Martens
(2011) reported that they excluded nearly half (43.4%) of the data from a study with
young participants whose data did not demonstrate a clear discounting effect. A possible
explanation for this is that young children typically do not have an extensive learning
history with a range of delays and reward magnitude.
A child may have limited prior experiences with making choices between SSR
and LLR and experiencing contingencies associated with those choices. This presents a
problem with hypothetical choice tasks because young children are expected to make a
series of choices across a range of hypothetical delays and rewards. This lack of history
with real contingencies may significantly impact choice allocation in hypothetical choice
tasks. In conventional behavioral methodology, it is commonly understood that behavior
is determined by past consequences. If a child has not experienced real consequences
associated with similar delays and reward magnitude to those presented in a hypothetical
task, then actual choices may be different than those that are verbally reported. For
example, Reed and Martens (2011) discuss this concern in the previously mentioned
study conducted with a sample of sixth-grade students. A temporal discounting task
consisting only of hypothetical choice trials was presented and nearly half of the students
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did not demonstrate a discounting effect. The authors explain that the students may have
had limited learning histories with similar choices.
If the degree of discounting in hypothetical choice tasks does not correlate to an
actual degree of discounting, then the use of hypothetical methods to identify impulsive
behavior in children is questionable. Additionally, if there is a lack of learning history
with rewards and delays presented in a task, then temporal discounting procedures based
on contact with real rewards and delays may help build a within-study learning history.
Choice responding may be different if a child experiences rewards and delays compared
to that of the hypothetical tasks even if the experience is only within the parameters of the
study. The effects of discounting delayed rewards demonstrated by the procedures with
real rewards and delays might more closely correspond to the behavior that they verbally
describe (Critchfield & Kollins, 2001). As a result, it is possible that temporal
discounting tasks based on real delays and rewards are more likely to demonstrate
consistent data patterns in young children.
Effects of a shifting delay procedure. A shifting delay procedure may be an
effective and possibly more efficient treatment than what is currently available for
teaching self-control responding to young children. Differential effects on choice
responding were observed in two of the four participants for whom treatment conditions
were employed. After the shifting delay procedure was implemented, both Fred and
Bobby allocated a higher proportion of choices to the LLR compared to baseline.
Although allocation of choices reversed to the SSR in the final phase of the shifting delay
procedure for Bobby, a significantly higher proportion of choices were allocated to LLR
overall when treatment procedures were implemented. Further, a shifting delay
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procedure is potentially a more efficient method of teaching delay-to-reinforcement
compared to a progressive delay procedure. For example, Fred’s calculated delay goal
was 129 s. If a progressive delay procedure was implemented with 5 s incremental delay
increases, he could ideally reach his goal in 50 to 52 trials. If a shifting delay procedure
was implemented, Fred could ideally reach his goal in 8 to 10 trials. The effects of a
shifting delay procedure observed in this study warrant future investigation.
Effects of a progressive delay procedure. The initial effects of the progressive
delay procedure observed with Jake support the current literature. The shifting delay
procedure did not differentially affect choice responding for Jake; however, the
progressive delay procedure demonstrated differential effects on choice responding
although at delay lengths far below those used in the shifting delay procedure. It is
unclear whether choice responding would have remained consistent at the delay without
further choice trials, however, initial effects demonstrated by the progressive delay
procedure on choice responding in young children supports those observed in previous
studies (Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988).
Generality of treatment effects. Pennies were presented in choice trials probed
across baseline and experimental conditions. Penny trials were identical to baseline 1, 2,
and 3 trials except the number of pennies did not change across treatment conditions and
remained constant at 3 immediate vs. 10 later. The purpose of conducting penny trials
was to investigate the possible generalization effects of experimental conditions to a
novel reward. Treatment effects were observed in the shifting delay condition for two
participants (Fred and Bobby) and in the progressive delay condition (Jake). When
penny trials were conducted alongside treatment trials, there were no clear differences in
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choice compared to baseline penny trials. In fact, there were a higher percentage of LLR
choices made in baseline conditions compared to treatment conditions for Jake, Fred, and
Bobby.
Treatment effects observed with Jake, Bobby, and Fred did not generalize to a
novel reward (pennies). There are four conclusions that may be considered. First, the
shifting delay and progressive delay procedures resulted in a change of choice responding
to LLR for edible rewards but not pennies. It is possible that the untrained stimulus
(pennies) was not similar enough to the trained stimulus (edibles) to promote stimulus
generalization. That is, pennies did not evoke the same response (choice for LLR) as the
edibles. Second, pennies are conditioned reinforcers and edibles are primary reinforcers.
It is possible that young children discount delayed conditioned reinforcers differently
than primary reinforcers. Young children may not have a learning history associated with
the value of pennies. If children do not have experiences related to contingencies
associated pennies, then pennies may not have the same subjective value as an edible.
For example, if a young child does not have experiences related to exchanging pennies
for rewards then the subjective value of a larger amount of pennies associated with a
delay may be less than the subjective value of a small number of pennies available
immediately. Third, pennies were not assessed as a preferred reward in this study.
Preference assessments were conducted across participants to identify a preferred reward
to be used in choice trials to identify treatment effects produced by teaching procedures.
However, pennies were chosen to assess generality effects because monetary rewards are
used often in temporal discounting tasks as a result of their association with access to
primary reinforcers (Scheres et al., 2006). Within the parameters of the current study,
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pennies were not exchangeable for rewards. Fourth, it is possible that satiation influenced
choice responding during penny trials. All three participants allocated a higher
proportion of choices to LLR during penny baseline trials compared to penny treatment
trials. Pennies are not consumable in contrast to the edible rewards used for teaching
trials. If participants were saving the pennies instead of exchanging them for other
rewards outside of the study, then it is possible that pennies lost their value due to
satiation.
It is important to note that no strategies were implemented to promote
generalization from the trained rewards to the pennies in the current study. Essentially, a
train and hope strategy (Stokes & Baer, 1977) was adopted as one purpose of this study
was to investigate generalization without explicit programming. It is possible that
generalization of treatment effects to the pennies may have been more likely if strategies
that promote generalization such as multiple exemplars or teaching loosely had been
utilized. For example, using a variety of rewards to teach delay-to-reinforcement
tolerance may increase the likelihood that treatment effects will be generalized to a novel
reward. In addition, training loosely by varying noncritical stimuli during teaching
sessions may increase the likelihood that the same choice response will be made across
settings and situations as those made during teaching sessions.
Limitations
There were several limitations of this study including (a) time constraints,
(b) parental influence, (c) adapted temporal discounting assessments, (d) low motivation
for rewards, and (e) self-imposed concurrent activities.
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Time constraints. In this study, time was a limiting factor as a result of the
school year ending. With at least two of the participants it would have been beneficial to
conduct further trials in order to draw more stable conclusions from the final conditions
implemented. For example, a progressive delay procedure was employed to investigate
differential effects on choice responding for Jake. An initial effect on choice responding
was observed as choice allocation was reversed to the LLR and remained consistent
across delays of 5 s, 10 s, and 15 s. At a delay of 20 s, Jake reversed choice allocation
back to the SSR. The school year ended and no further trials were possible. However,
further trials would be necessary to determine a pattern of choice responding at this and
additional increased delays. For Bobby, when the larger reward choice was shifted to 10
later during the shifting delay procedure, an abrupt reversal in choice allocation to the
SSR was observed. The reversal in choice responding may indicate that the shifting
delay procedure did not maintain initial effects observed within the first three phases.
One choice trial presenting both smaller and larger options available immediately
(3 marshmallows now vs. 10 marshmallows now) resulted in a choice for the smaller
reward. This was interpreted as low motivation for the LLR, however, further trials
would be necessary to verify consistently low motivation for the reward and investigate
other potential variables influencing choice responding.
Parental influence. Two of the children verbally reported to the experimenter
that they were instructed by a parent to respond in a specific manner during choice trials,
and it is unclear how this variable affected choice allocation for those participants. For
Sally, an abrupt change in choice responding was observed during baseline 1 and
continued across baselines 2 and 3 which were associated with an increased delay (mean
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delay identified by the TCIP task multiplied by 12) and the removal of the concurrent
activity. She later reported that her mother instructed her to choose the LLR. Although
there was a marked increase in delay in baselines 2 and 3 and no distracting activity
available in baseline 3, choice responding remained constant for LLR. The abrupt
change in responding and resistance to discounting the LLR across baseline procedures
supports the potential influence that parental intervention had on choice allocation. For
Bobby, an abrupt change in choice responding from the LLR to SSR was observed during
the final phase of the shifting delay procedure. Choice responding remained constant for
the SSR across a reversal to the previous shifting delay phase in which choice was
previously allocated to LLR. He reported that his mother instructed him to choose the
SSR, and the abrupt change in responding supports the potential influence that parental
intervention had on choice allocation. It should also be noted that the experimenter did
not ask participants if they were instructed by a parent or teacher to respond in a
particular way during choice trials. It is unclear if parent or teacher intervention
influenced responding across any of the participants.
Adapted temporal discounting assessments. The experimenter designed the
non-computerized and computerized temporal discounting assessments used in this study.
Both assessments presented 120 hypothetical choice trials that consisted of a constant
LLR with manipulation of the SSR in ascending and descending sequences as described
by Critchfield and Kollins (2001). Smaller delays and reward magnitude as well as
implementation of a visual delay are all examples of procedures adopted from Scheres et
al. (2006). The adapted assessments used in this study yielded inconsistent data patterns
across the three participants for whom the procedures were implemented. Although the
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designs of the assessments were based on procedures supported by the literature, the
validity of the newly developed assessments is not empirically supported.
Low motivation for rewards. It is possible that there was a loss of motivation
for rewards for two of the participants over the course of this study. Limited trials were
conducted daily with only two to three trials per day (never exceeding 20 individual
rewards; e.g., Goldfish); however, it is possible that satiation occurred over time. For
Jessica, two choice trials presenting both smaller and larger options available
immediately (3 Goldfish now vs. 10 Goldfish now) resulted in choices for the smaller
reward. For Bobby, one choice trial presenting both smaller and larger options available
immediately (3 marshmallows now vs. 10 marshmallows now) resulted in choice for the
smaller reward as well. The choice for the SSR in this choice trial was interpreted by the
experimenter as low motivation for the LLR. In this choice option, the subjective value
of the larger reward is not discounted as a result of a delay. The two options differ only
in objective value. A choice for the SSR may indicate that the value of the larger reward
is decreased because motivation for the reward is low. Schweitzer and Sulzer-Azaroff
(1988) reported similar observations of possible satiation, as two participants would
occasionally return their rewards to the experimenter.
Self-imposed concurrent activities. It was observed in this study that several
participants engaged in self-imposed verbal activity during the delay. Participants were
observed counting, talking, and telling stories. For example, in the current study Fred
was observed counting to 20 during the delay across several trials. Researchers have
proposed that concurrent activities self-employed by young children may be explained as
a predetermined choice for the LLR (Rachlin & Green, 1972). For example, if Fred
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committed to choosing the LLR before the choice trial was presented, then a self-imposed
concurrent activity such as counting could serve as a distractor for tolerating the delay. In
the current study, it is unclear how self-imposed concurrent activities may have
influenced choice responding..
Future Research
There are a variety of future directions suggested by this research study including
(a) expansion of the empirical basis for current teaching procedures, (b) the effects of an
abolishing operation on choice responding, and (c) replication of the shifting delay
procedure.
Expansion of the literature. Future research should further investigate the
development of procedures for increasing delay-to-reinforcement tolerance and
expanding the empirical foundation of methods currently available. Behavior analysts
have operationally defined “impulsivity” and “self-control,” and are refining procedures
to objectively assess this behavior, but there is a general lack of research-based treatment
options for teaching delay-to-reinforcement tolerance. Behavior is affected by the
environment on an individual level and needs to be addressed accordingly. There are
currently a limited number of research-based procedures for addressing impulsive choice
responding in young children.
It is also necessary to further investigate procedures currently available to teach
delay-to-reinforcement tolerance. Concurrent activities and progressive delay procedures
are the most widely investigated procedures used to increase choice responding for LLR.
However, the literature is limited in two ways. First, these procedures have been largely
investigated as treatment packages such as a progressive delay procedure plus concurrent
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activity (Binder et al., 2000; Dixon & Holcomb, 2000; Dixon et al., 2003). Few studies
have investigated the procedures separately (Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Schweitzer &
Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988). It is also necessary to identify variables critical to each
procedure’s effectiveness in order to develop standardized procedures essential to its
application. Second, there are limited studies that have investigated these procedures with
young children (Dixon & Cummings, 2001; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988). Young
children are more likely to yield impulsive choice responding patterns (Scheres et al.,
2006). It is possible that teaching a child to choose larger delayed rewards may lead to
choices for more favorable rewards in daily life. If consistent choices for LLR are made,
maladaptive behaviors may be less likely to develop. Further research is warranted to
develop standardized procedures to teach delay-to-reinforcement.
Effects of an abolishing operation on choice responding. Future research
might investigate the effects of an abolishing operation on choice responding. An
abolishing operation is a stimulus that has two effects on behavior (a) a value altering
effect and (b) a behavior altering effect (Laraway, Snycerski, Michael, & Poling, 2003).
When a stimulus is presented that serves as an abolishing operation, the value of a reward
diminishes and behaviors that have accessed that reward in the past decrease as well. For
example, drinking a large glass of water will decrease its value and engaging in behaviors
that have resulted in water in the past will decrease as well. When presenting individuals
with choice options between SSR and LLR, it is possible that delivering a small amount
of the reward prior to choice trials (pre-trial rewards) may serve as an abolishing
operation for the reward and individuals may be able to better tolerate the delay to the
LLR. The effects of the abolishing operation may make it more likely that individuals
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will better tolerate delay to the LLR. For example, assuming that marshmallows were
identified as a preferred reward, then providing a small amount of marshmallows prior to
a choice trial may serve as an abolishing operation for the SSR and make it more likely
that a delay to the larger reward would be tolerated. For example, if 3 marshmallows are
delivered before a choice trial of 3 marshmallows now or 10 marshmallows later, it may
be possible that the value of the SSR and behaviors that access the SSR are decreased.
The diminished value of the SSR and decreased likelihood of making a choice for the
SSR may make it more likely that an individual would choose the LLR. The small
amount of pre-trial reward could be systematically faded out until no more pre-trial
rewards are delivered once choice responding for LLR is consistent. This procedure
differs from the one investigated in the current study in two ways. First, the small amount
of reward would be delivered prior to the choice trial and would not be associated with
either choice option. Second, the small amount of reward would fade out completely until
it is no longer delivered prior to choice presentation.
Replication of the shifting delay procedure. Positive effects of a shifting delay
procedure were observed with two out of the four participants exposed to this condition.
For the other two participants, treatment was ineffective in shifting choice allocation. The
current study is the first to closely manipulate the amount of rewards to alter impulsive
choice responding. Although the effects observed in this study were not robust, those
observed with Bobby and Fred may warrant further investigation to establish if shifting
the amount of a delayed reward is a viable treatment option. It may be more beneficial to
replicate shifting delay methods investigated in this study to establish treatment efficacy
before investigating variations of the procedure.
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General Conclusions
Procedures that reverse choice responding from smaller immediate rewards to
larger delayed rewards are important to teaching an organism to tolerate delayed
reinforcement. If young children are taught to tolerate delay, then choices will result in
more favorable outcomes and maladaptive behaviors are less likely to develop.
Behavioral treatments designed to reduce impulsive choice responding have produced
positive outcomes but are not well established in the current body of literature. Thus,
there is a need for standardized treatment procedures and treatment options available to
teach children to choose delayed rewards.
The current study yielded differential effects across participants and provide
several important implications. First, the utility of hypothetical temporal discounting
tasks with young children is questionable. It is possible that temporal discounting tasks
based on real delays and rewards are more likely to demonstrate consistent data patterns
in young children. Second, a shifting delay procedure may be an effective and possibly
more efficient treatment than what is currently available for teaching tolerance of delayto-reinforcement in some young children. Third, the initial effects of progressive delay
procedures demonstrated by previous literature are further supported by this study.
Although the current study has several limitations, the implications are important to the
expansion of literature investigating temporal discounting procedures used with young
children and providing directions for future research.
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Appendix A
List of Terms
Objective Value – the actual worth of a reward
Subjective Value – the perceived worth of a reward
Temporal Discounting – a decrease in subjective value of a reward as function of delay to
the reward’s presentation
Larger Later Reward (LLR) – a larger number of reinforcers available after a delay
relative to a small number of reinforcers available more immediately
Smaller Sooner Reward (SSR) – a small number of reinforcers available more
immediately relative to a larger number of reinforcers available after a delay
Indifference Point – identified when both the larger later reward and smaller sooner
reward are equally preferred or equal in subjective value
Choice Response – identified preference for a reward option through vocal or gestural
indication
Choice Responding – multiple preferences for rewards identified through a series of
choice trials
Impulsivity – a stable pattern of choices allocated to smaller sooner rewards
Self-control – a stable pattern of choices allocated to larger later rewards
Delay-to-Reinforcement Tolerance – choosing larger rewards associated with a delay
over small rewards available more immediately
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Appendix B
Recruitment Flyer

!
!

Volunteers Wanted for a Research Study

Delay Discounting: Using a Shifting Delay Procedure to Teach
Self-Control
The purpose of this research is to investigate a procedure that may
be effective in teaching a child to make less impulsive choices,
thus demonstrating self-control. The study will measure the
choices that a student makes when presented with the choice
between a smaller sooner reward and a larger later reward. The
study will take approximately 1 to 2 months to complete.!
!

Every student from the class is invited to participate.
!
Students who participate will receive small incentives for
participating in the study such as stickers, erasers, or pencils.
!
The study will be conducted at Hope Preschool. To learn more
about this research, contact Tiffany Freeze Denton at 615584-2990.
!
This research is conducted under the direction of James
Meindl, Ph.D., BCBA-D in the Instruction and Curriculum
Leadership department of The University of Memphis.
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Appendix C
Consent Form
!
Parental Permission for Your Child to Participate in a Research Study
Delay Discounting: Using a Shifting Delay Procedure to Teach Delay-to-Reward
WHY IS YOUR CHILD BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH?
Your child is being invited to take part in a research study about using a teaching procedure to
teach the skills of choosing a larger later reward instead of a smaller sooner reward, a
characteristic of self-control. Your child is being invited to take part in this research study
because any child in the classroom is invited to participate. If your child takes part in this study,
your child will be one of about 9 children to do so.
WHO IS DOING THE STUDY?
The person in charge of this study is Tiffany Freeze Denton, Ed.S., NCSP, BCBA of The
University of Memphis Department of Instruction and Curriculum Leadership. She is being guided
in this research by James Meindl, Ph.D, BCBA-D. There may be other people on the research
team assisting at different times during the study.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY?
The purpose of this study is to investigate a procedure that may be effective in teaching a child to
make less impulsive choices, thus demonstrating self-control.
By doing this study, we hope to learn if this new teaching procedure is successful in teaching selfcontrol when children are asked to make choices.
ARE THERE REASONS WHY YOUR CHILD SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY?
There are no known factors that will exclude your child from participating in this study.
WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?
The research procedures will be conducted at Hope Preschool. Your child will need to come to a
designated room at Hope Preschool approximately 15 to 20 times during the study. Each of
those visits will take about 5 to 15 minutes. The total amount of time your child will be asked to
volunteer for this study is 1.5 hours over the next 2 months.
WHAT WILL YOUR CHILD BE ASKED TO DO?
Visit 1: The first visit will include a brief assessment that will identify preferred rewards for your
child. Basically, your child will be allowed to choose the most preferred reward from several.
Visit 2: The second visit will include an assessment that will identify the degree of impulsivity that
your child exhibits. Your child will make several choices between a reward that he/she would be
given immediately or a larger reward that he/she would get later. In this phase of the study, your
child will not be given the rewards chosen.
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Visits 3-19: The rest of the visits except for the last visit will include your child making one choice
between a smaller reward that he/she will be given immediately or a larger reward that they will
be given after a short delay. In this phase of the study, your child will be given the reward that
he/she chooses.
Final Visit: The last visit of the study will be the same as the second visit. It will include an
assessment that will identify the degree of impulsivity that your child exhibits. Your child will make
several choices between a reward that he/she would be given immediately or a larger reward that
he/she would get later. In this phase of the study, your child will not be given the rewards chosen.
At the end of each visit, your child will receive a small incentive for participation such as a sticker.
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS?
To the best of our knowledge, the things your child will be doing have no more risk of harm than
your child would experience in everyday life.
WILL YOUR CHILD BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
There is no guarantee that your child will get any benefit from taking part in this study. However,
some people have experienced the ability to make less impulsive choices, relating to self-control
when similar teaching procedures have been used. Your child’s willingness to take part,
however, may, in the future, help society as a whole better understand this research topic.
DOES YOUR CHILD HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY?
If you decide to allow your child take part in the study, it should be because your child really
wants to volunteer. Your child will not lose any benefits or rights your child would normally have if
your child chooses not to volunteer. Your child can stop at any time during the study and still
keep the benefits and rights your child had before volunteering. !
IF YOUR CHILD DOES NOT WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY, ARE THERE OTHER
CHOICES?
If your child does not want to be in the study, there are no other choices except not to take part in
the study.
WHAT WILL IT COST YOU FOR YOUR CHILD TO PARTICIPATE?
There are no costs associated with taking part in the study.
WILL YOUR CHILD RECEIVE ANY REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
Your child will receive small incentives for taking part in this study such as stickers, erasers, or
pencils.
WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT YOUR CHILD PROVIDES?
We will make every effort to keep private all research records that identify your child to the extent
allowed by law.!
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Your child’s information will be combined with information from other children taking part in the
study. When we write about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the
combined information we have gathered. Your child will not be personally identified in these
written materials. We may publish the results of this study; however, we will keep your child’s
name and other identifying information private.
We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that
your child gave us information, or what that information is. Your child’s name will be converted to
code so each participant's identity is unknown. In addition, all data will be kept either on a
password-protected computers or in locked file drawers.
The student's decision to participate will be held confidential. To maintain this confidentiality,
parental consent will be mailed directly to the researcher. In doing so, only those individuals
participating in the study will be aware of their participation.
We will keep private all research records that identify your child to the extent allowed by
law. However, there are some circumstances in which we may have to show your child’s
information to other people. For example, we may be required to show information which
identifies your child to people who need to be sure we have done the research correctly; these
would be people from such organizations as The University of Memphis.

CAN YOUR CHILD’S TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY?
If your child decides to take part in the study your child still have the right to decide at any time
that your child no longer want to continue. Your child will not be treated differently if your child
decide to stop taking part in the study.
The individuals conducting the study may need to withdraw your child from the study. This may
occur if your child are not able to follow the directions they give your child or if they find that your
child’s being in the study is more risk than benefit to your child.
WHAT IF YOUR CHILD HAVE QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS, CONCERNS, OR
COMPLAINTS?
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation for your child to take part in the study, please
ask any questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions,
concerns, or complaints about the study, you can contact the investigator, Tiffany Freeze at 615584-2990. If you have any questions about your child’s rights as a volunteer in this research,
contact the Institutional Review Board staff at the University of Memphis at 901-678-3074. We
will give you a signed copy of this permission form to take with you.
WHAT IF NEW INFORMATION IS LEARNED DURING THE STUDY THAT MIGHT AFFECT
YOUR CHILD’S DECISION TO PARTICIPATE?
If the researcher learns of new information in regards to this study, and it might change your
willingness for your child to stay in this study, the information will be provided to you. You may be
asked to sign a new permission form if the information is provided to you after your child has
joined the study.
Thank you for your consideration in allowing your child to participate in this study.

!

105!

_________________________________________
Signature of person agreeing to take part in the study

____________
Date

_________________________________________
Printed name of person agreeing to take part in the study

_________________________________________
Name of person obtaining informed consent
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____________
Date

Appendix D
IRB Approval
The University of Memphis Institutional Review Board, FWA00006815, has reviewed
and approved your submission in accordance with all applicable statuses and regulations
as well as ethical principles.
PI NAME: Tiffany Freeze
CO-PI:
PROJECT TITLE: Delay Discounting: Using a shifting delay procedure to teach delayto-reinforcement
FACULTY ADVISOR NAME (if applicable): James Meindl
IRB ID: #3008
APPROVAL DATE: 12/6/2013
EXPIRATION DATE: 12/5/2014
LEVEL OF REVIEW: Expedited
RISK LEVEL DETERMINATION: No more than minimal
Please Note: Modifications do not extend the expiration of the original approval
Approval of this project is given with the following obligations:
1. If this IRB approval has an expiration date, an approved renewal must be in
effect to continue the project prior to that date. If approval is not obtained, the
human consent form(s) and recruiting material(s) are no longer valid and any
research activities involving human subjects must stop.
2. When the project is finished or terminated, a completion form must be completed
and sent to the board.
3. No change may be made in the approved protocol without prior board approval,
whether the approved protocol was reviewed at the Exempt, Exedited or Full Board
level.
4. Exempt approval are considered to have no expiration date and no further review
is necessary unless the protocol needs modification.
Approval of this project is given with the following special obligations:
Thank you,
Ronnie Priest, PhD
Institutional Review Board Chair
The University of Memphis.
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